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Net Assessment: Former Soviet Union -- In Search of Revival



The states that once comprised the Soviet Union continue to
decline on all levels: Temporary economic successes cannot halt a
downslide that began during the final years of the socialist
republic. Moscow alone is trying to generate momentum toward
regional revival through stronger ties with Europe. There appears
to be a growing consensus in Moscow that not only is it
impossible to retreat further geopolitically, but also that to
survive as a regional power and to be able to defend its vast
perimeter, Russia must pursue at least a modestly expansionist
policy.

Given the weakness of all erstwhile Soviet states, including
Russia, the door is open for outside powers to step up pressure
on the region. The United States, Europe, China, Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, Iran and Islamic militant groups are all expanding their
political clout there. The future of all the former republics
will depend on whether Russia, the only post-Soviet heavyweight,
can pull them out of the quagmire. Given the region's history of
repeated revivals under challenging circumstances, the former
Soviet Union (FSU) just might have a chance to retain its status
as a global player with which to contend.


Potentially Valuable but Tough Terrain

Geography has been more of a liability than an advantage for the
FSU. To begin with, the fact that the post-Soviet space occupies
what might be the world's most strategic location has made it an
arena for fighting for thousands of years.

The sheer vastness and the ethnic diversity of the region make
foreign relations difficult to manage. The fact that many
neighboring states and distant powers alike have diverse, often
conflicting, agendas in the region only adds to that challenge,
as does the need to protect thousands of miles of borders. On the
positive side, however, it is hard for an outsider to conquer
such a vast territory -- a fact that Napoleon, Hitler and others
learned too well and too late.

The climate itself threatens the former Soviet republics' chances
of ever attaining the standards of productivity and economic
efficiency seen in developed countries. Its location in the
northern latitudes means that most industries must exert greater
effort than more southerly countries to produce or extract a unit
of any product. For this reason, Russian and even Caspian oil
exploration, extraction, refining and transportation are doomed
to be significantly more costly than in the Middle East.

Although Russia has access to three oceans, it lies too far north
to succeed as a sea power: Most of its seaports and naval bases
are iced in for months at a time. Thus, sea powers such as the
United States and Britain always will have an advantage over the
FSU, including Russia, in naval power and, therefore, in
projecting global power.


Is It Good To Be Rich in Resources?

The post-Soviet space is probably the world's richest region in
terms of natural resources. Someday, its combined estimated oil
and gas resources might surpass those of the Persian Gulf.
Ukraine's black soils are unparalleled as arable land; the future
of the world's timber and wood-processing industry is tied to
vast territories covered with taiga -- seemingly endless virgin
coniferous forests -- in eastern Russia. And if clean, drinkable
water eventually becomes the world's most precious commodity,
Russia could draw upon Lake Baikal, the world's deepest lake, in
eastern Siberia: It contains more potable water than all of the
world's other lakes combined.

Used effectively, any one of these natural resources has the
potential to make the state or group of states that owns it a
powerful world player. So far, however, the former Soviet
republics have done a poor job of taking advantage of them.
Although the high price of oil has helped keep the economies of
the oil-rich states in the region afloat for the past several
years, little can be said about positive effects of the abundance
of natural resources in the post-Soviet space. On the contrary,
the former Soviet republics have chosen to implement more
complicated means of production in virtually all sectors, with
poor efficiency across the board.

Also, although plentiful minerals and other resources have the
potential to attract outside investment and, in turn, to boost
local economies, they also could attract foreign governments
seeking to control those -- thus potentially adding to the
region's security risks. Conflicts among former Soviet states
over resources located along shared borders, such as in the
Caspian Sea, are also possible. Tensions already exist among some
Central Asian states over scarce resources such as water,
electricity and gas.


Twelve Years of Decline

Overall, the former Soviet republics have made no meaningful
economic or geopolitical advances since the fall of the Soviet
Union about 12 years ago. In fact, many of them resemble
developing nations. In Russia, living standards, among other
economic measures, have dropped to "Third World" levels. For the
former Soviet states, shipping ever-increasing volumes of oil to
the West is bringing their economic status closer to that of
Equatorial Guinea than to that of the United Arab Emirates: The
profits are not being used to raise living standards, nor to
build up other industrial sectors. Russia and the other former
Soviet republics are simply very weak and on the slow but sure
path to further decay and possible collapse.

Russia alone has gained a measure of economic security, thanks to
the high price of oil, but it remains very vulnerable, since
global oil prices are beyond Moscow's control. Foreign
investment, meanwhile, remains too low to spur the economy -- a
situation that will endure until legal and economic reforms can
improve what is now a somewhat chaotic environment. Investment in
production, especially in the manufacturing sector, is dropping
steadily. Businesses suffer a chronic shortage of capital, and
while real production (except in the energy sector) dwindles,
imports rise. All exports other than those of natural resources
are falling. Within the decade, the production facilities
comprising the bulk of what the former republics own will become
too old to function. This situation is serious, since thus far
virtually no new facilities and equipment have been built to
replace them.

It is not only the Russian economy that is in decline. So too is
the country's population, which is shrinking by almost 1 million
people per year. The ailing infrastructure; failing social
system; rising drug use; growing incidence of AIDS, tuberculosis
and other diseases and people-trafficking, slavery and other such
problems all contribute to what is a systemic crisis. The
military-industrial complex, too, is being downsized: In 2004,
the government will reduce spending on the military-industrial
complex by half the amount requested by the Defense Ministry and
planned by the Cabinet.

In Russia, the flight of natural and human resources as well as
capital -- to the tune of $30 billion per year, according to
Interpol sources -- is a steady trend. Corruption and organized
crime have reached epic proportions: In 2003, 93 of the Duma's
450 members reportedly were under criminal investigation at the
time of their election, and many had criminal records. For now,
parliamentary immunity has put a halt to all investigations.
According to documents circulated within the Duma, Russian
officials gain $40 billion through corruption. There are about
10,000 organized crime groups that, having divided the whole
country into various territories, take "protection" money from
state and private enterprises and from foreign businesses. A
source on a Russian legislative committee on internal law
enforcement and security says that 16 percent of police officers
are paid by criminal groups to participate in illegal activities,
such as extortion and fabricating or closing criminal cases. The
situation is mirrored throughout most of the former Soviet
republics.


The Russian Federation: More Splintering?

The Russian Federation runs the risk of breaking up into smaller
entities. If Russia eventually loses the war in Chechnya -- or if
that battle drags on for too long -- separatists in other parts
of the country likely will rally, eventually spelling the end of
the federation. The potential for secession is developing in
Dagestan and in other Muslim-dominated republics in the North
Caucasus. There is also a chance that the Kuril Islands and the
Kaliningrad region might have to be turned over to other
countries. However, the surest sign that the Russian federation
might split up is the fact that regions with ethnic-Russian
majorities show tendencies toward secession. These include
Primorsky Krai -- which encompasses Vladivostok -- Magadan and
Sakhalin Island.

Moldova is still not united, Georgia is breaking apart and
Azerbaijan is dealing with secessionist movements among its
ethnic minorities. In Ukraine, the political divide between the
west and the rest remains serious, resulting in the possibility
that the country might split apart along the former Russia-
Austria border.

The idea of a "Commonwealth of Independent States" remains mostly
just that: a concept. The only organization for integration that
still has a chance to succeed is the Eurasian Common Economic
Space, which comprises the four most geopolitically important
republics in the region: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.


Pressure Builds From Outside

Given the region's state of weakness, external players are
looking to fill the power vacuum. These include the United
States, Europe, China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Islamic
militants.

The United States has become the most influential foreign power
in the region, with Russia now second. China is building
influence in Central Asia and is slowly expanding economically
and demographically into the Russian Far East. Ankara has made
strides in relations with Central Asia, Georgia, Azerbaijan,
Ukraine and Moldova.

Although the threat in Russia from Islamic militants is
immediate, the U.S. push into the post-Soviet space remains the
long-term strategic challenge for Russia, Belarus and
Turkmenistan. Moscow and Washington do not see eye-to-eye on some
key foreign and security policies -- including matters such as
Iraq -- and they likely will have disagreements in the future.
Therefore, NATO's eastward expansion and the stationing of U.S.
forces in several former Soviet states could undermine Russia's
national security. Nevertheless, Moscow's strategic nuclear
arsenal, while it exists, guarantees that Washington, Beijing and
other world players will not completely write off the country.

Meanwhile, among the other former Soviet states, the struggle to
decide between alignment with Russia and the United States is
being replaced by the challenge of deciding between a pro-
European and a pro-U.S. course. Because of fresh ties with Paris
and Berlin and its serious disagreements with Washington on
important security and foreign policy matters, Moscow is steering
more decidedly toward greater alignment with the European Union;
the other former Soviet republics are trying to befriend both
camps.


Weak Borders

The Russian Federation cannot survive for long under current
conditions. The combination of continued economic and social
decline, the likelihood of political fragmentation and the
growing pressure from external players eventually will lead it to
repeat the fate of the original Soviet Union.

If Russia loses the war in Chechnya, its disintegration as a
federation is all but assured. Russia has not been able to cut
off supply lines to Chechen militants from two sources: organized
crime groups from the former Soviet republics and Wahhabi Muslim
organizations originating in the Middle East. These lines of
supply will remain functional until Russia retakes control of
some of the predominantly Muslim regions of the former Soviet
Union. In particular, Moscow has to regain some control over
Georgia and Azerbaijan, through which supplies flow to Chechen
militants. Only this would guarantee that Russia would not lose
the war in Chechnya.

Russia's long and porous southern border, which lacks natural
barriers and defense fortifications, currently cannot be
defended: Islamists from the Middle East and Central Asia easily
surf through sparsely populated Kazakhstan and directly into
Russia, from the Volga Region to Siberia. And these groups are
working to coordinate their efforts: The Islamic Movement of
Turkmenistan was recently formed, along the lines of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan. Also, another global Islamist group,
Hizb-ut-Tahrir, has become the most popular radical group among
the Central Asian populace.

Russia's western borders, 80 miles from St. Petersburg and 240
miles from Moscow, are also poorly protected and easily
penetrated by foreign spies, militants and other destabilizing
elements. And if a major conflict with NATO were to erupt in the
future, Russia would not be able to defend its capital, which
lies close to the western border.


What Path Will the Republics Take?

Given all of these factors, it is likely that whoever is in power
in Moscow will try to reverse the decline and restore some degree
of influence within the former Soviet Union -- not necessarily by
depriving the republics of independence but by reinstating some
degree of Russian influence and control. Stratfor sources
indicate that within the Russia national security establishment,
a consensus is emerging that not only is there no way to retreat
further geopolitically without risking the state's long-term
cohesiveness, but also that Russia's borders are not defensible
under current circumstances. The general notion gaining ground is
that to survive as a regional power, Russia should pursue at
least a modest expansionist policy.

Of course, Russia and the region as a whole still have the
potential to regain some ground economically, politically and in
terms of self-defense. Russia still has great intellectual
potential, as well as a history of quickly spearheading the
turnaround of its military-industrial complex -- even though its
civilian sectors might lag far behind. Russian weapons systems,
even some that were merely test versions, rank among the world's
best.

The former Soviet states so far have made little effort, overall,
to reverse their fortunes, although Russian President Vladimir
Putin is trying to lead an effort to regain some of his country's
former prominence. His efforts do not imply that the general
orientation toward the West and the implementation of market
reforms will be reversed -- or at least not now, when the major
changes being attempted are reining in the oligarchs and building
closer ties with Europe. The trick for Moscow lies in reforming
or removing the oligarchs without upsetting the only recently
obtained re-entrance of foreign capital and technology into the
state's economy.

The oligarchs and the so-called New Russians, who have stashed
billions of dollars in Western banks and have bought Western
properties and businesses, are not helping the economies of their
home countries. The rest of the populace in the former Soviet
republics lacks the capital to make meaningful positive changes
in their economies.

The struggle between those who prefer the status quo -- the
oligarchs are among them -- and those who want to see change is
beginning to take shape in some of the former Soviet states. In
Russia, it is taking the form of confrontation between oligarchs
and Putin, who is supported by some in the national security
establishment. The government seems to support the combination of
open-market policies and state capitalism to offset what is
called the "wild market" preferred by the oligarchs.

The populace by far supports this fledgling policy, although it
is not yet clear how far Putin will pursue it. For many Russian
citizens, the struggle for revival ties into a slowly growing
perception that external forces, particularly the United States,
are subjugating the country.

Putin and his inner circle represent a moderate faction of those
trying to revive the country as the regional hegemon, but more
radical ideas do exist among the opposition in Russia and in
other former Soviet republics. Among the radicals, hope for
integrating and reviving the former Soviet states lies in
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.

Polls by the Russian Federal Security Service -- the results of
which remain unavailable to the public -- indicate that if
presidential elections were held in a united Russia and Belarus
this year, Lukashenko easily would win -- precisely because of
his radical approach toward restoring the former might of the old
Soviet Union.

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