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THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
22 September 2003

by Dr. George Friedman

The Balkan Theater of Operations


Summary

There are three dimensions to the U.S. war against the Islamist
world: within the United States, within Islamic countries and
along the periphery of the Islamic world. The Balkans has been
one of the neglected theaters of conflict along this periphery.
The recent visit of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen.
Richard Myers focuses our attention on this area.

Analysis

The U.S.-Islamist war has three dimensions. There is the covert
duel within the United States, between U.S. security forces and
what are assumed to be al Qaeda operatives present in the
country. There is a second dimension within Muslim countries,
where Islamist forces struggle against the current governments.
This includes theaters where U.S. forces are overtly and covertly
involved, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In the third dimension,
conflict exists along the frontiers of the Islamic world, where
Muslims and non-Muslims engage in active combat.

These frontier conflicts divide into a number of separate
theaters of operation. There is, of course, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, in which Jews confront Muslims. There is
the conflict in Kashmir between Hindu India and Islamists. There
is Chechnya, where Muslims confront Orthodox Christian Russians,
and the Philippines, where Catholics confront Muslims. There is a
range of smaller theaters in Africa. However it is divided, it is
useful to think of three dimensions to the war, which is
occurring in various theaters.

One theater of operations to which our attention has been drawn
is the Balkans. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard
Myers visited the region last week, reminding us not only that
U.S. troops are still deployed there, but also that the Balkans
is one of the points where the Islamic world interfaces with the
rest of the globe. It also reminds us of a critical antecedent of
the current war and of an important fact that has been forgotten:
The first major conflict between the Islamic world and its
surroundings took place in the Balkans, and the United States
intervened in that war on the side of the Muslims.

The Balkans historically had been unstable, because the region
was where three worlds -- the Muslim, the Catholic and the
Orthodox Christian -- interfaced. This was far from the only
fault line: Ethnicity, dynastic lines and clan conflict created a
constantly shifting constellation of relationships. Geography
also played a part, since the rugged hills of the Balkans allowed
various groups to retain their identities in the face of
occupations by Romans, Turks and Germans.

As in Afghanistan and other areas of rugged terrain and long
history, it was possible to suppress but not erase the
distinctions that existed. The distinctions always led to
conflict, but -- again, as with most mountainous regions --
resources were scarce and war was a means toward building wealth.
Relative peace occurred only when there was an external force so
threatening to everyone in the region that solidarity was the
only thing that made sense -- or when the region was occupied by
a power so overwhelming or ruthless that it made sense to bide
one's time. Thus, during the Cold War, there was a consensus that
becoming a Soviet satellite was unacceptable, and therefore Tito
was able to impose a stasis on the region. Alternatively,
effective occupation by the Turks in the 18th century did not
erase conflict, but suppressed it somewhat.

When the Cold War ended, the Soviet threat disappeared, as did
the legitimacy of Marxism. When the pressure released, the
artificial unity of the South Slavs, or Yugoslavia, evaporated.
It was very much as if a spring, tightly coiled, exploded. The
result was not a civil war, but a series of national wars between
nations whose autonomy had been suppressed by a multinational
state. Added to this was a state that had never been part of
Yugoslavia, but which nevertheless was intimately involved and
affected by its policies: Albania. This was not only because it
was a small, vulnerable country surrounded by a much larger and
stronger state, but also because history had left many Albanians
on the wrong side of the border.

A three-way war broke out that roughly, though not perfectly,
paralleled religious distinctions. Catholic Croatia, Orthodox
Christian Serbia, and Muslim Bosnia -- and later Albania --
engaged in a complex war from which Macedonia and Slovenia
managed to hold themselves aloof. The slaughter and inhumanity on
all sides was striking. As would be expected, the most powerful
entity, Serbia, was by definition able to inflict the greatest
atrocities, but only weakness made the other parties more
virtuous. The war was seen by all sides as an opportunity to
rectify centuries of legitimate grievances, so complex and arcane
that no outsider could truly understand the issues and certainly
could never grasp the passions.

The United States and the West viewed this conflict through the
prism of the post-Cold War world. In their views, there were no
fundamental issues separating the world's serious powers. They
all wanted the same thing -- economic growth and political
stability. During Desert Storm, the world had united to stop a
rogue state, Iraq, that had threatened both objectives. Other
peacekeeping operations followed the same line -- a united world
administering a simple world, dealing with occasional rogue
nations.

Yugoslavia -- or more precisely, the Serbian remnant of that
entity -- was ranked with Iraq, North Korea, Libya and other
isolated states that threatened regional stability and had to be
stopped before they became regional hegemons that could disrupt
economic development. The further assumption was that the
citizens of these nations, Serbia included, would welcome the
fall of the repressive regimes.

Therefore, the American analysis of the Balkans ran thus: There
was no systemic problem in the Balkans, but rather, a problem
rooted in a regime that would not follow international norms of
behavior. That nation was in the process of committing genocide
and had to be stopped. The most desired means of changing Serbian
behavior was negotiation, backed by the threat of force and
followed by peacekeeping troops. That was the model followed in
Bosnia with the Dayton Accords, albeit after the bloodbaths had
already taken place. In the Kosovo model, direct force was
applied to Serbia in the form of an air campaign that targeted
the entire country, followed by a political settlement, followed
by peacekeeping troops.

There have been many conspiracy theories about why the United
States did what it did, but the truth is simpler and in some ways
more amazing. The United States did not see the Balkans question
as directly affecting any immediate American geopolitical
interest. Rather, the situation there was of concern because if
the disruption was not suppressed, other regions might
destabilize. The United States had an interest in global
stability as the foundation for global economic growth: A tear in
the fabric anywhere was seen as potentially unraveling things
elsewhere. Moreover, if the West could not suppress chaos in
Europe itself, its ability to control chaos elsewhere would be
compromised.

Nothing that went on in the Balkans was seen as having a direct
effect on the United States. The United States had no systemic
enemies; its task was to police outbreaks of hooliganism so that
the peace Washington now saw as permanent and desirable would not
be compromised. Nothing in the Balkan situation itself was of
direct significance to the United States.

The United States did not see itself as intervening on behalf of
anyone. It saw itself and its coalition partners as neutral,
indifferent to the local issues, acting as umpires to make
certain that the contestants remained within the bounds of
humanity and decency. To the extent to which U.S. forces were
intervening on anyone's side, it was the side of the victim.
Since the victim was, by definition, the weaker party, Washington
was intervening against the stronger power -- Serbia -- and in
favor of the weaker powers, Bosnia and Albania.

One of the conceits of peacekeepers is the belief in their
neutrality. Whatever their intentions, it is impossible to
intrude into a complex political and military situation without
affecting the outcome. In affecting the outcome, of course,
someone wins and someone loses. Therefore, on the ground, the
intervention is always seen as benefiting someone and hurting
someone else. This is the disconnect between the peacekeeper and
the actors on the ground. The peacekeeper might well intend to be
neutral, but he is always experienced as highly partisan. In that
unintended partisanship lies the complexity of peacekeeping.

In this case, the intervention was seen as being on behalf of
Muslims. The United States could argue that it was on behalf of
peace and justice, but none of the combatants doubted for a
moment that the guns were pointing at the Serbs, not the Muslims.
What the region could not understand was why the United States
was intervening on behalf of the Muslims. Interesting theories
circulated -- that the United States was intervening on behalf of
the Muslims because the Saudis had offered to reduce the price of
oil; that the intervention was designed to buy the Israelis room
for maneuver against the Palestinians; that the intervention was
designed to support Chechen Muslims against the Russians.

The lack of an immediate geopolitical interest generated
fascinating theories, but the truly important reason was missed:
Washington failed to understand the world it was facing. Then-
President Bill Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger made a profoundly simple
miscalculation. They assumed that there were no longer any major
threats to the United States, and that the primary issue was
dealing with rogue states. If that was the case, it didn't matter
who the United States helped or hurt so long as it contained the
rogues. They did not anticipate either Sept. 11 or the complex
confrontation that was looming between the Islamists and the
United States. Many others missed this event, so they were hardly
alone, but the fact was that they shaped their intervention
without much reference to the three dimensions we began by
discussing.

Which meant that the United States intervened on behalf of the
Islamic forces. In retrospect, it might have been assumed that
the intervention would have bought the United States some
credibility in the Islamic world. It has not, essentially because
it in no way addressed the real interests of al Qaeda, and
because the Clinton administration never effectively linked the
intervention to a strategic demarche in the Islamic world. The
administration's mindset -- the idea that the United States was
intervening, not on behalf of Islamic forces, but on behalf of
stability -- made it impossible for the government to exploit the
intervention effectively. They would have had to admit the
obvious -- that it was an intervention on behalf of Islam -- and
that was something the Clinton administration couldn't do.

The problem now is threefold. First, Islamist elements present in
both Albania and Bosnia are in a position both to use the region
as a transit point and to hit U.S. troops in both areas. Second,
the peacekeeping forces deployed in both countries are not
actively involved in the war on al Qaeda, but are incidental to
whatever operations are taking place in the Balkans. Finally, the
region is open to exploitation by al Qaeda at a time and place of
its choosing -- and there are insufficient U.S. forces in country
to be effective, but too many to be safe.

The Balkan theater of operations has not been quiet. Incidents
are constant but not widely reported. Moreover, there are ample
indications that Islamist forces are present and able to carry
out operations. U.S. covert forces have operated in the region as
well, searching for al Qaeda. Nevertheless, the region could
explode in Washington's face at any time. Neither the Bosnian nor
Albanian governments want this to happen, but al Qaeda would not
necessarily consult them.

The paradox is this. Should the Islamist forces in Bosnia, Kosovo
or other parts of the region move aggressively, the United States
does not have sufficient forces in either place, and the
willingness of European governments to act decisively is, at
least in our minds, questionable. Their definition of "decisive
action" may differ from that of the United States. The only power
that has an interest in controlling Islamic actions in the region
is, interestingly, Serbia. Different time, different regime, but
same national interests. What could happen is that, in the end,
the United States must rely on the Serbs to deal with the current
war.

All in all, a cautionary tale about the complexity of
geopolitics.
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