Führer: [...]
British propaganda is emphasizing two facts, namely, the Russo-German agreements, which in practice mark the end of the Anti-Comintern Pact, and the treatment whicli is said to have been meted out in Poland to the genuinely Polish population. On this point the German counterpropaganda seems late and weak. A people which has been ignominiously betrayed by its miserable politico-military governing class but which – as you yourself chivalrously recognized in your Danzig speech – fought courageously, deserves a treatment which does not give occasion for hostile speculations. It is my conviction that the creation of a modest, disarmed Poland which is exclusively Polish, liberated from the Jews – for whom I fully approve your project of gathering them all in a large ghetto in Lublin – can no longer constitute any threat to the Greater Reich. If this were done, it would be an element of great importance which would deprive the big democracies of any justification for continuing the war and would liquidate the ridiculous Polish Republic created by the French and British at Angers. Unless you are irrevocably resolved to prosecute the war to a finish, I believe that the creation of a Polish state under the German aegis would be an element that would resolve the war and constitute a condition sufficient for the peace. [...]
I am profoundly convinced that Great Britain and France will never succeed in making your Germany, assisted by Italy, capitulate, but it is not certain that it will be possible to bring the French and British to their knees or even divide them. To believe that is to delude oneself. The United States would not permit a total defeat of the democracies. Empires crumble for lack of internal equilibrium, whereas blows from the outside may consolidate them. As you have said, it is possible to foresee an outcome of the war with both sides losing. Now that you have secured your eastern frontiers and created the Greater Reich of 90 million inhabitants, is it worth while to risk all – including the regime – and sacrifice the flower of German generations in order to hasten the fall of a fruit which must of necessity fall and be harvested by us, who represent the new forces of Europe ? The big democracies carry within themselves the seeds of their decadence. [...]
Agreements with Russia. No one knows better than I, who have now had 40 years of political experience, that politics – even revolutionary politics – has its tactical exigencies. [...[ I realize that since von Ribbentrop’s efforts toward nonintervention by the French and the British were not realized, you have avoided a second front. Without striking a blow, Russia has, in Poland and the Baltic, profited from the war.
But I, a born revolutionist who has not modified his way of thinking, tell you that you cannot permanently sacrifice the principles of your Revolution to the tactical exigencies of a certain political moment. I feel that you cannot abandon the anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevist banner which you have been flying for 20 years and for which so many of your comrades have died; you cannot renounce your gospel, in which the German people have blindly believed. It is my definite duty to add that a further step in your relations with Moscow would have catastrophic repercussions in Italy, where the anti-Bolshevik unanimity, especially among the Fascist masses, is absolute, solid as rock, and indivisible.
Permit me to believe that this will not happen. The solution of your Lebensraum problem is in Russia and nowhere else; in Russia, which has the immense area of 21 million square kilometers and 9 inhabitants per square kilometer. Russia is alien to Europe. In spite of her extent and her population, Russia is not a power but a weakness. The mass of her population is Slavic and Asiatic. In olden times the element of cohesion was furnished by the people of the Baltic; today, by the Jews; that explains everything.
Germany’s task is this: to defend Europe from Asia. That is not only Spengler’s thesis. Until 4 months ago Russia was world enemy number one; she cannot have become, and is not, friend number one. This has profoundly disturbed the Fascists in Italy and perhaps also many National Socialists in Germany.
The day when we shall have demolished Bolshevism we shall have kept faith with our two Revolutions. It will then be the turn of the big democracies, which cannot survive the cancer which is gnawing at them and which manifests itself in the demographic, political, and moral fields.
Duce!
[...]
I read in your letter a passage that makes me suspect that you thought my decision to take action against Poland arose entirely from the conviction that England and France would not enter into the war on any account. I should like to call to mind, Duce, my letter of August 26, 1939 [...] In its closing passage I wrote that since neither France nor England could gain decisive victories in the West, whereas after defeating Poland Germany would be enabled by the agreement with Russia to free all her forces in the East, and with superiority in the air unequivocally on our side, I was not afraid to settle the question in the East, even at the risk of an entanglement in the West.
[...]
Duce! When I made up my mind last fall to take action against Poland I did so in order to ward off attacks which would have been intolerable for any great power. To be sure, Germany had previously endured these attacks for almost a matter of decades [...] There came a moment when the German people would not have deserved to be regarded as a great nation if they had put up with such treatment any longer. I believe that what we swallowed for months even in the year 1939 can be explained only by the stolid nature of the German temperament. If in a similar situation and with a similar distribution of forces the Italians had had to endure only 5 percent of what the Germans in the territories stolen by Poland had been subjected to for nearly 2 decades there would have been an explosion. Any further toleration of these incidents would not have led to relieving the situation but would have resulted in the severest damage to Germany’s prestige as a great power. And the question was not whether the problem might not possibly have been put off, say, another 2, 3, or 4 months, for there is no doubt that considering the intensity of the hate propaganda among the Polish people (which, moreover, was constantly fanned by the British!), incidents would have occurred which would eventually either have forced the German people to act, or else would have brought about an irremediable breach between the people and the Government. In particular, however, Poland would have been able to carry into effect her plan to annex Danzig with much less risk in the winter. Beginning with October, Germany would have been in a difficult position to meet such attempts with the vigor which it was still possible to muster in September. From that season onwards, the climate of eastern Europe precludes any fast- moving tactical operations. In that event, the result might have been just what our Western enemies were hoping for: the prolonged containment of a large number of German divisions in the East, with all the undesirable consequences of a war on two fronts.
Hence there remains only the question whether, in view of the possibility that England and France might enter the war, Germany should have abstained from any reaction, even in the event of an occupation of Danzig by Poland, in order to postpone the big altercation until some later date!
Duce! I have naturally given very thorough thought to these questions. It would have been really impossible to endure patiently these intolerable conditions any longer – and they might have grown even worse – without gravely injuring the prestige of the German Reich internationally, and above all of its Government at home. And even apart from this an objective consideration of the general situation made it imperative to reject such an alternative.
Duce! From the moment when England discovered during the Ethiopian conflict that Germany is not a vassal state that can be ordered about at will, and especially since the intervention by the Reich in Spain in behalf of the Spanish Nationalist regime, she began to think about and prepare for the conflict with the Reich. With the introduction of universal military service in England, it became clear that the leading British government circles had already made up their minds about the coming war on the totalitarian states. To my mind it seemed rather unimportant against whom the first blow would be directed. The elements behind this decision aimed at the whole, that is, nothing less than the elimination of the regimes which by their very natures represent a threat to the feudalistic-reactionary plutocracies. In this objective all forces inimical to us are agreed. In view of the planned British armaments and the provisions made by England for mobilizing all imaginable auxiliary forces (first of all Poland), I thought that it would be wiser after all not to lose any more time, which would involve a further loss of prestige, but instead to take up the defense at once, even at the risk of setting off 2 or 3 years ahead of schedule the war which was being planned by the West.
For how could our armaments have been improved upon in 2 or 3 years, Duce? As far as the relative strength of the German Wehrmacht was concerned, there was scarcely any room for a substantial change in our favor, considering the manner in which England was building up her armament under full steam. In the East, moreover, the situation could only have deteriorated. Thus it has been possible for me in less than a month entirely to eliminate the Polish state as a threat and thereby free Germany in the rear. The losses which we suffered in this campaign – grievous as they are, of course, for the individuals affected and their families – were insignificant on the whole. [...] Our losses in materiel are not worth mentioning. In weapons and ammunition they are offset many times by the booty which fell into our hands.
The psychological gains for the German Wehrmacht (especially for the Luftwaffe and the Army) are immense. [...]. And wherever the German weapons and ammunition industry had not already reached peak production, it now has achieved its planned wartime capacity.
The sense of superiority over our Western opponents animating both officers and troops is absolute and unqualified! This feeling has been strengthened by the development of the war to date in the West, on the sea and in the air. Nevertheless I fully realize, Duce, that the coming battle will not be a walkover, but the fiercest struggle in Germany’s history. The troops, too, are aware of this. They are entering into this struggle with a holy, nay, truly awesome resolution. This realization, Duce, that this is a battle for life or death imposes upon me the imperative necessity to take everything into consideration that might in any way be of benefit to us in this struggle.
[...]
I believe, Duce, that there can be no doubt that the outcome of this war will also decide the future of Italy. If that future is viewed in your country merely as the continued survival of a modest European state, then I am wrong. But if that future is conceived as a guarantee of the existence of the Italian people from the historical, geopolitical, and general moral viewpoints, that is, according to the criteria of your people’s right to existence, Duce, then you will some day be confronted by the same opponents who are fighting Germany today. I know full well, Duce, that you yourself do not think differently on the subject. I also know that all your measures to date, the many forms of aid which you have extended to me in the past months, diplomatically through your press, militarily through your mobilization, and in material things, too, are all prompted by this realization. I, too, see the destinies of our two countries, our peoples, our revolutions and our regimes indissolubly joined with each other.
Germany’s relationship to Russia is the outcome of:
The appraisal of the general situation gives the following result:
Since Stalin’s final victory, Russia has without doubt experienced a modification of the Bolshevist principle in the direction of a nationalist Russian way of life, which is out of the question for us, but which could not be replaced by anything else in Russia herself at the present time. That which made National Socialism the mortal enemy of Communism was the latter’s Jewish-international leadership with its avowed goal of destroying the non-Jewish nations or their leading forces. How far-reaching this, to our minds, epochal change in Russia has been is something which the Reich Foreign Minister will be able to describe to you, Duce, from his personal impressions and experience. For my part I merely wish to say that since Litvinov’s departure there has unquestionably been a change in Russia’s attitude toward Germany. There can be no doubt that the conditions for establishing a reasonable relationship between the two countries exist today. We no longer have any reason for believing that any Russian agency is trying to exert influence on German domestic affairs. [...]
If Bolshevism in Russia is developing into a Russian national state ideology and economy, it constitutes a reality which we have neither interest nor reason to combat. On the contrary! In our struggle against the blockade of the world by the plutocratic democracies, Duce, we can only welcome every factor and every assistance. Germany and Russia have often lived in peace and friendship for very long periods of time.
Our economies complement each other to an extraordinary degree. There is almost no raw material which we need that Russia does not possess or could not make available to us within a reasonable time. And, conversely, there is not a product of German industry which Russia does not either already need or will not need in the foreseeable future. The trade agreement which we have concluded with Russia, Duce, means a great deal in our situation!
Specifically, however, what Germany has done was simply a clear-cut delimitation of zones of interest with respect to Russia, in which nothing will ever change again.
[....]
Finland! Germany, as I have already stressed, Duce, is fighting for her existence. We have been denied the most natural rights to such a degree that we could not today withhold sympathy for the situation of a great power, such as Russia undeniably is, with respect to its access to the seas. I believe that a modicum of reason and objectivity in examining and deciding these problems would have given the Finns better counsel than that of resorting to arms. Russia, I am convinced, never intended to take up this fight, for otherwise she would have chosen a different season of the year; and in that event there is no doubt in my mind that Finnish resistance would have been broken very quickly.
The criticisms which have been made of the Russian soldiers in consequence of the operations to date are not borne out, Duce, by reality and the facts. During the World War we fought the Russians so long and so bitterly that we can permit ourselves an opinion on that. Taking into consideration the available supply facilities, no power in the world would have been able, except after the most thoroughgoing preparations, to achieve any other results at 30 to 40 degrees below zero [C] on such terrain than did the Russians at the very first. The scorn heaped upon the Russian troops, however, has in my opinion made it very hard for Stalin to accept, not to speak of to offer, a compromise.
But in this instance England has no other aim than to secure a legal basis under the terms of the League of Nations by which other nations could gradually be drawn into the war. We are watching this maneuver, Duce, with calm attention. Besides, Germany has no particular obligations toward Finland. The Finnish state owes its existence entirely to a sea of blood from German soldiers, German regiments and divisions, and its subsequent independence is also due to German units under General von der Goltz. In appreciation of this Finland later took sides against Germany on every occasion, and so far as it was possible took active part in every repressive measure against Germany. This does not imply, Duce, that the German people feel any hatred for the Finnish people; it merely signifies that we have no cause to champion Finland’s interests.
Poland! In regard to Poland, Germany has only one outstanding interest, and that is absolute security for the eastern boundary of the Reich. At least during the war we cannot avoid also taking on the ballast of administering the General Government. But there is one fact one must not deceive oneself about: If I had withdrawn the German troops from the General Government at the end of the war, this would not have brought about a pacification of Poland, but a hideous chaos. And the Church would not have been able to exercise its function in praise of the Lord there, but the priests would have had their heads chopped off, as was done in all places from which the German troops were withdrawn. Moreover, the big Polish land-owners and the Polish intelligentsia would not be in that part of Poland now continuing their rule as of old, that is, mistreating the Polish people, but would now really be sitting in Paris or London, because it is evident they would have lacked the means of brute force to save themselves from the love of their subjects. Apart from all this, Duce, that country would hardly have survived this winter at all if it had not been for our reconstruction effort, especially in the field of transport. For although the Polish soldiers were incapable of checking the advance of the German Army, they destroyed thousands of railroad bridges, crossings, etc., and so caused all traffic to come to a standstill. The achievements in the reconstruction effort accomplished by the German engineers, railroad construction battalions, and the Reich Labor Service cannot find the appreciation abroad that they deserve because they are either unknown or willfully ignored.
I shall have a copy of the interim report on the conditions in that country and the circumstances which compelled us to take action there delivered to you, Duce. That account portrays a mere fraction of what actually happened there. On my travels in Poland, I witnessed such an incident myself in the Tucheler Heath as early as September 4. Twenty minutes before we passed along one of those long forest roads, a German hospital convoy with its entire complement of doctors and medical corps men, together with 80 wounded, was cut down or massacred by a Polish cavalry brigade which was still roaming through that area; only one man escaped who had pretended to be dead and then, covered with blood, made his report directly to me when we reached the scene. But those are only minor matters, Duce. The Poles were lucky indeed that they had the good-natured German people to deal with, and what is more, with the more than restrained German Wehrmacht. When the Commune was crushed in Paris in 1871 it is estimated that the Versailles troops put to death between 30,000 and 50,000 communards. And these men were the most innocent lambs compared with those Polish criminals, and their deeds mere childish pranks measured against the horrifying incidents which occurred in Poland.
In all this, Duce, I am naturally speaking only of the fate that overcame the Germans in Poland. But one could go a step further and speak of the fate of the Ruthenians. Even the blood night at Bromberg and the massacres of the Germans in Thorn pale compared to this, it must be admitted.
[...]
Germany has absolutely no other war aim than peace! England and France have basically no other war aim than the annihilation of the totalitarian people’s states, and thus of Germany. Germany will therefore fight until this plutocratic clique of war criminals is forced to abandon this design once and for all. This resolve cannot be shaken! It can be all the better understood because over and above this task we must in any case settle a chapter of world history which, through fraud on one side and weakness on the other, forced the German people into the most humiliating and frightful period of their entire development.
[...]
Yours,
Adolf Hitler
Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Duce, in
the Presence of Count Ciano and Ambassador von Mackensen
Rome, March 10, 1940
[...] The [Foreign Minister] turned the conversation to Russia. The Führer had already given expression in his letter to Mussolini to everything that needed to be said on the subject. The Foreign Minister added that he was firmly convinced, on the strength of his own experience during his two visits to Moscow, that Stalin had renounced the idea of world revolution.
“Do you really believe that?” inquired the Duce.
The Foreign Minister gave an affirmative answer and stated that the Spanish adventure had been the last bid for world revolution. At the Duce’s query whether the Third International had also given up all thought of a world revolution, the Foreign Minister replied that the Third International, in his opinion, confined itself exclusively to propaganda and informational work. His impression was that Russia was not only in the process of becoming a normal national state, but had even progressed quite far in that direction. There were no more Jews in the central agencies, and even Kaganovich, who had always been said to be of Jewish blood – something which he had no way of checking – looked more like a Georgian.
After Litvinov’s departure all Jews had left the key positions. On his [Ribbentrop’s] second visit to Moscow he had had the opportunity at a dinner given by Stalin to talk with all of the members of the Politburo. The German party had also included some old National Socialists, like Gauleiter Forster, and it was Forster in particular who had declared after the banquet that it had been just like talking with old party comrades. That had been also his own (the Foreign Minister’s) impression.
This might perhaps sound a little strange, but to his mind the Russian orientation – which was of course Communistic and therefore unthinkable for a National Socialist – had nothing to do with world revolution any longer. Stalin was seeking to give the Russian empire a centralized organization and had already achieved this goal to a large extent, for nothing happened in Russia any longer without his desire. To this end he had employed methods which had been the order of the day in Russia since time immemorial, and on seeing the picture of Tsar Alexander that was still hanging in the Kremlin one might almost have the illusion, in view of these tendencies, of calling on a Tsar and not on Stalin.
The Duce remarked to this that Stalin actually thought that he was Alexander’s successor.
The Foreign Minister went on to say that the Politburo consisted of 100 percent Muscovites who no longer had much interest in other countries, but on the contrary had the tendency to isolate their country from the rest of the world. Russia did not constitute either an internal or an external threat to National Socialism or Fascism. As a matter of fact, there was no evidence that the Russians had tried any meddling in Germany’s domestic affairs since the conclusion of the Russian pact. The Führer held that there was naturally a clear distinction between Bolshevism and National Socialism, but that a favorable trade agreement could be concluded with Russia just the same; that a sizable number of divisions, which in different circumstances it would have been necessary to hold in reserve as a covering force against the Russians, had now become available for the West; and that the understanding with Russia had freed Germany at the rear. Russia was going through a change of global proportions. She had dropped the idea of world revolution. The ties with the Third International had, to Germany’s knowledge, been loosened, and the Russian figures in the Third International had been largely frozen out.
With her orientation turned entirely inward as a result of the organizational changes which the Bolshevist regime was undergoing, Russia was not contemplating any action in the international field.
The Finnish conflict – Germany had accurate knowledge of this from special sources – was an affair into which Russia had slid without her own doing. The Finnish Foreign Minister, Tanner, a Menshevik, had given his country bad advice, and as a result of English influence a situation had eventually been brought about which had affected Russia’s prestige and had left her no choice but to go to war in the middle of winter. Russia’s original intention had been to conclude treaties with Finland similar to those concluded with the Baltic States.
In these circumstances the Russians were no threat to the Balkans, either. Stalin would, of course, at any time conclude a treaty with Rumania that would give him the whole or part of Bessarabia. But considering the unpredictable repercussions in other countries and the certainty that as a result the war would spread over the entire Orient, he would surely not embark upon a war with Rumania.
The all-important consideration was that the men in the Politburo, such as, for instance, the chief of the GPU [Lavrenty Beria], with whom the Foreign Minister had had a long talk, were 100 percent Muscovites, who would have nothing to do with Paris, London, and Washington, and were tending toward a Russian – not a Pan-Slavic – nationalism, but also had certain revisionist aspirations.
The Duce conceded that possibly the Third International was actually unable to launch a world revolution any more because the German-Russian agreement has caused a tremendous confusion in the Communist parties of the Western countries, which to him marked the end of the Communist world movement. The Communists in the Western countries believed, moreover, that “Stalin had gone to Berlin,” and not vice versa.
In this connection the Foreign Minister underlined the firm attitude of the National-Socialist party comrades in Germany, who, as a result of the realistic political thinking which had been gradually developed under National Socialist training, had unreservedly welcomed the German-Russian agreement.
The Duce stated in this connection that he had already written the Führer that he had a full understanding of the political necessity for the agreement, since it spared Germany a second front and guarded her flank. Although Russia was perhaps not quite in top form militarily, yet she was in a position to operate with large masses, and mass always meant strength. On that account it was really foolish of the Western European press to try to make the Russian Army an object of scorn by calling it a “herd,” an expression which Herriot had used. This was absolutely false propaganda.
[...]
At the Duce’s question whether he thought there was any prospect of peace, the Foreign Minister said it was difficult to say. If the Finns were wise they would make peace with the Russians now. The Films had pursued a very bad policy all along. The Foreign Minister had had them advised before the outbreak of the conflict that they should make every effort to reach a peaceable solution. He distinctly recalled that reports of a forthcoming agreement had arrived in Berlin on a certain day from both Helsinki and Moscow. But at that point Anglo-French influence had been brought to bear on Finland through the former Swedish Foreign Minister, Sandler, which bolstered the position of Finnish Foreign Minister Tanner and so brought on the war. Twenty-four hours after the outbreak of hostilities, however, the Finnish Minister to Berlin had told him, the Reich Foreign Minister, that the Finns were prepared to accept all of the Russian demands. All this only went to show how badly Finnish policy had been conducted.
The Foreign Minister next turned to the situation in terms of the German Army. He repeated that the Führer did not believe there were any possibilities of peace. Sumner Welles* mission was easily explained in terms of strictly domestic political issues in America; there were other interpretations which claimed that his actions were a maneuver in collusion with England calculated to cause Germany to defer the execution of certain plans. But even if in view of the anti-war attitude of the American people one did not wish to deny that Sumner Welles’ mission had the character of an honest attempt, Germany’s enemies had gone too far in committing themselves to the repeatedly proclaimed aim of a war of annihilation to be able to change their goal now. In view of this situation the Führer was determined to break the enemy’s will to annihilate and, in order to accomplish this, to attack England and France at the time he considered proper. Playing the prophet was always a dubious business, but he, the Foreign Minister, was in a position to state that Germany hoped that the French Army would be beaten before next fall and that after that the only British soldiers left on the Continent would be prisoners of war.
The Foreign Minister recalled that while he had told Count Ciano at Salzburg that he did not think England and France would necessarily go to Poland’s aid, yet he had always reckoned with the possibility of an intervention by the Western Powers.13 He was now glad that matters had taken such a turn because, in the first place, it had always been obvious that the clash would occur sooner or later and that it was inescapable. As to the timing, they on the German side had taken the position, partly in consideration of Italy’s preparation, that the conflict would not break out before 2 or 3 years had passed. These had also been the Führer’s views. On the other hand, however, he had been aware that it would be desirable to get the conflict over with during the lifetime of the Duce and the Führer. The attempt on the Führer’s life at Munich had shown that a statesman’s life often hung by a silken thread, and on that account the Führer had sought to bring about a decision while he was still in the prime of life. Secondly, from the moment when England introduced universal military service, it was clear that in the long run the ratio of power could not be maintained in Germany’s and Italy’s favor. This consideration had been a factor in shaping the Führer’s decision to solve the Polish question even at the risk of intervention by the Western Powers. The decisive factor, however, had been that a Great Power could not afford to put up with certain things.
The Foreign Minister handed Mussolini the book on the Polish atrocities, with the promise that an Italian translation would follow later. The situation, which had been difficult from the outset, had reached such a point that in recent months Polish chauvinism had almost gone head-over-heels in its ravings about a march on Berlin, while terrorization of the Volksdeutsche continued on an increasing scale. In August the Poles had sent notes to Berlin of such insolence that, had they been published, the cannons might have gone off by themselves, so outraged would the feelings of the German people have been. There were limits to one’s forbearance. On top of this, the Polish agreement of 1934 had been concluded only upon the insistence of the Führer, and even so it was very unpopular in Germany. But instead of utilizing this agreement to settle the difficulties between the two countries, the Poles had on the contrary taken advantage of it to maltreat the German minority in an incredible manner. This, of course, became known in Germany, and popular sentiment became inflamed to the extreme, so that last summer the Führer was faced with the question whether to accept a long winter campaign against Poland, as England and France evidently intended, at the same time exposing the Germans in Poland to unbearable abuse during the campaign, or else to strike promptly. In the given circumstances the Führer could not have done anything but choose the second alternative.
[...]
The Foreign Minister continued by stressing the German people’s unshakable faith in victory. There was not a German soldier who did not believe that victory would be won this year. That, said the Duce, was an extremely interesting remark. What animated the German people was not the flag-waving sort of patriotism [ hurra-Patriotismus] but a firm purpose. Germany’s position was favorable. The blockade had proved ineffective. Germany’s food supply was assured with the help of the reconquered former German provinces. It was only in fats that the German people had to accept any restrictions, but that could only better their health. Under the trade agreement Germany was to receive from Russia 1 million tons of grain in the first year, and from 1.5 to 2 million tons later. He was able to state confidentially that Russia was very generous in the matter of raw material deliveries and even used her own gold to purchase some of the raw materials destined for Germany. In addition, she gave valuable assistance in respect to transit of goods. Thus large quantities of critical materials were being sent from Manchukuo through Russia. Also the Balkan countries, such as Rumania, had a share in supplying Germany; and Italy was not last in providing valuable economic assistance, for which the Führer had asked him to convey special thanks to the Duce. Thus Germany’s supply of food and raw materials would not encounter any difficulties even in the event of a long war.
[...]
At the Duce’s question, “What program do you have for your stay in Rome, Comrade Ribbentrop", the Foreign Minister replied that he was entirely at the Duce’s disposal. The Duce then proposed having another discussion on Monday afternoon at 5 o’clock.
[...]
The Foreign Minister then informed the Duce confidentially that Germany would take the offensive with 205 fully equipped and well-trained divisions. He pointed out that Germany’s experience in the West, especially a recent raid on a British outpost, where 16 British soldiers had been captured, showed that the British were miserably trained and poorly equipped, and that the superiority of the German foot soldier over his opponent was equivalent to three to one. The British lacked any training in modern fighting, as needed for bunker warfare, for instance. It was not as simple as all that to put civilians into uniform, give them a smattering of training and then send them to the front to do the job of full-fledged soldiers.
[...]
Next the Foreign Minister talked about the experience of World War I. The British had had very poor leadership in the last war. Some of their crack units had been good, but on the average they had been inferior to the German Army. The French Army, too, was no longer what it had been in 1914, as recent experience in the West had demonstrated.
The Duce commented that the French had a defensive mentality. Everything was all right as long as they were sitting in their pill boxes, but as soon as they had to leave that shelter the consequences of the bad morale in France became evident in the troops, too. When he referred to the Communist movement in France and to the fact that Communist papers were even allowed to continue publication, the Foreign Minister replied laughingly that some of these Communist papers were printed in Germany.
The Duce referred in this context also to the bad morale in England, where an anti-war meeting had recently been held with a large attendance, and the number of conscientious objectors 20 had risen to 24,000. Besides, the Foreign Minister added, in a recent by-election a candidate had been elected on an anti-war platform.
The Foreign Minister also stated that the Führer was enjoying the best of health and was very eager for the fray. The Duce added on his part that the Führer was quite right in saying that the German and Italian peoples had a common destiny. The Western democracies made no distinction in their hostility to the two countries.
The Foreign Minister replied that one basic reason for the attitude of the plutocracies was the fear that the leading ideas of Germany and Italy might find their way to the other countries and so put an end to the plutocracies in the United States, England, and France. The Polish documents which he had given the Duce showed that the plutocracies hated the Duce and the Führer from the bottom of their hearts. This was partly explained by their bad consciences and by the fear that the Fascist and National Socialist ideas might find adherents. The Duce interjected that Germany and Italy were the proletarians, as it were, and the other countries the conservatives, and it should be borne in mind that the Western countries would do everything in their power to defend their system to the last. But their morale was low and they had no officers. The Foreign Minister replied that he was fully convinced that the British and French Armies were moving toward the greatest disaster of their histories. Germany was quite aware that the campaign would not be as easy as the one in Poland, but the Führer, who was very cautious in his calculations, was firmly convinced after a careful comparison of the relative merits of the opposing armies and an accurate appraisal of the total situation that England and France would receive a crushing defeat.
The Foreign Minister to the Foreign Ministry Telegram
Rome, March 11, 1940
Only for the Führer personally.
My reception by the Duce and Ciano was especially cordial.
[...]
I handed the Duce seven Polish documents, of which I read him the last, most interesting one, which is an especially crass documentation of the hatred of the democracies for Italy and Germany, and of America’s co- responsibility for the outbreak of the war. The Duce said that he had always thought this was the case and that he would study the documents carefully.
I then explained to the Duce our view of the Russian question on
the basis of my personal impressions of Moscow. The Duce
interrupted to ask various questions and replied that, in his
opinion, world Communism had received a mortal blow as a result of
the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact.
Conversation Between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Duce
in the Presence op Ambassador von Mackensen and Count Ciano
March 11, 1940
[...]
On the Italian side, however, a clear distinction had been drawn between the political and the ideological aspect of this [German-Russian] relationship. As regards the ideological aspect, the Duce had remained absolutely intransigent. “I am and always will be anti-Communist,” he stressed with vigor, for Communism was incompatible with the historical and economic, that is, the natural foundations of life. The Foreign Minister agreed with him and characterized Communism as being even contrary to nature, to which the Duce added that it was precisely in nature that the principle of inequality was constantly demonstrated to us.
He believed that Russia would refrain from any propaganda work for a while since, as he had said yesterday, a tremendous confusion had broken out among the Communists of all countries as a result of the German-Russian agreement. But once Russia has disposed of these international difficulties, the Bolshevists were sure to start up their propaganda all over again. Germany had been wise to conclude the pact with Russia, as he had already said in his letter to the Führer, because the pact gave Germany the assurance that she would have to fight on only one front, which was a factor of capital importance.
[...]
Regarding the Russo-Finnish conflict the Duce noted that a peace would be entirely advantageous to Germany and Italy. He added that Germany and Italy had an interest in Russia’s not taking action against Rumania. Any Russian move against Bessarabia would result in an extremely complicated situation and the entire Danube basin would be in danger of becoming involved in the conflict, which would certainly be against Germany’s interests in view of the supply situation. The Foreign Minister stated with emphasis that Germany, too, wanted the Balkans to remain quiet. [...] The Duce inquired if it were not possible for Germany to prevail on Russia to leave the Balkans alone and to confirm this intention by some sort of declaration or gesture. A step of this kind would also provide favorable conditions for the restoration of good relations between Russia and Italy, mainly of an economic but also of a political nature.
[...]
The Duce said he was convinced that France and England were opposed to Germany and Italy, and that they made no difference between the two countries. Once one was destroyed, it would be the turn of the other, for Fascism and National Socialism were looked upon as the same thing by the Western states, which proved the community of interest between Germany and Italy. Italy represented the reserve that would do its duty when the time came, and wanted to be regarded as such.
[...]
The Foreign Minister stated that all this led to the conclusion that in the Duce’s view there existed a community of destiny between the two countries which sooner or later would bring about Italy’s entry into the war. The Duce replied that such a development was inescapable. Germany and Italy represented the new ideology. The other countries, on the other hand, represented the old concepts and ideas. Besides, these old countries had such an increasing population deficit that they could no longer be counted among the European nations proper. British ships were manned with Indians, French ships with Negroes. These countries no longer had any “elan vital”, and they looked with jealousy upon the young nations.
The Duce answered in the affirmative the Foreign Minister’s question as to whether he thought the French would again concentrate stronger forces on the Italian border. He added that these troops included many Negroes, who were very impulsive but not good in sustained fighting. No one knew what was really going on in the minds of these African auxiliaries. Among themselves they talked a language which the French did not understand, and their attitude could be a great threat to France in the event of military reverses.
For the Führer only.
The second conversation with Mussolini was very cordial.
The Duce shares the Führer’s opinion as to the common destiny of Germany and Italy. Italy therefore stands unalterably and firmly on the side of Germany. [...] The Duce said that Italy will enter the war on the side of Germany; if necessary, he would offer provocation. In accordance with the Führer’s instructions, I did not for the moment go into the all-important question as to the time of Italy’s entry into the war, but reserved this for the Führer’s personal conversation with the Duce.
This has been set for the Brenner Pass the early part of next week, if the time is agreeable to the Führer. I shall arrive at 6:37 this evening.1 2 3 I should be grateful if you would let me know whether I am to report this evening or tomorrow morning.
Duce : I am writing this letter to you at a moment when months of anxious deliberation and continuous nerve-racking waiting are ending in the hardest decision of my life. I believe – after seeing the latest Russian situation map and after appraisal of numerous other reports – that I cannot take the responsibility for waiting longer, and above all, I believe that there is no other way of obviating this danger – unless it be further waiting, which, however, would necessarily lead to disaster in this or the next year at the latest.
The situation: England has lost this war. With the right of the drowning person, she grasps at every straw which, in her imagination might serve as a sheet anchor. Nevertheless, some of her hopes are naturally not without a certain logic. England has thus far always conducted her wars with help from the Continent. The destruction of France – in fact, the elimination of all west European positions – is directing the glances of the British warmongers continually to the place from which they tried to start the war: to Soviet Russia.
Both countries, Soviet Russia and England, are equally interested in a Europe fallen into ruin, rendered prostrate by a long war. Behind these two countries stands the North American Union goading them on and watchfully waiting. Since the liquidation of Poland, there is evident in Soviet Russia a consistent trend, which, even if cleverly and cautiously, is nevertheless reverting firmly to the old Bolshevist tendency to expand the Soviet State. The prolongation of the war necessary for this purpose is to be achieved by tying up German forces in the east, so that – particularly in the air – the German Command can no longer vouch for a large-scale attack in the west. I declared to you only recently, Duce, that it was precisely the success of the experiment in Crete that demonstrated how necessary it is to make use of every single airplane in the much greater project against England. It may well happen that in this decisive battle we would win with a superiority of only a few squadrons. I shall not hesitate a moment to undertake such a responsibility if, aside from all other conditions, I at least possess the one certainty that I will not then suddenly be attacked or even threatened from the east. The concentration of Russian forces – I had General Jodl submit the most recent map to your Attache here, General Marras – is tremendous. Really, all available Russian forces are at our border.
Moreover, since the approach of warm weather, work has been proceeding on numerous defenses. If circumstances should give me cause to employ the Luftwaffe against England, there is danger that Russia will then begin her strategy of extortion in the south and north, to which I would have to yield in silence, simply from a feeling of air inferiority. It would, above all, not then be possible for me, without adequate support from an air force, to attack the Russian fortifications with the divisions stationed in the east. If I do not wish to expose myself to this danger, then perhaps the whole year of 1941 will go by without any change in the general situation. On the contrary, England will be all the less ready for peace for she will be able to pin her hopes on the Russian partner. Indeed, this hope must naturally even grow with the progress in preparedness of the Russian armed forces. And behind this is the mass delivery of war material from America which they hope to get in 1942.
Aside from this, Duce, it is not even certain whether we shall have this time, for with so gigantic a concentration of forces on both sides – for I also was compelled to place more and more armored units on the eastern border and also to call Finland’s and Rumania’s attention to the danger – there is the possibility that the shooting will start spontaneously at any moment. A withdrawal on my part would, however, entail a serious loss of prestige for us. This would be particularly unpleasant in its possible effect on Japan. I have, therefore, after constantly racking my brains, finally reached the decision to cut the noose before it can be drawn tight. I believe, Duce, that I am hereby rendering probably the best possible service to our joint conduct of the war this year. For my general view is now as follows:
1) France is, as ever, not to be trusted. Absolute surety that North Africa will not suddenly desert does not exist.
2) North Africa itself, in so far as your colonies, Duce, are concerned, is probably out of danger until autumn. I assume that the British, in their last attack, wanted to relieve Tobruk. I do not believe they will soon be in a position to repeat this.
3) Spain is irresolute and – I am afraid – will take sides only when the outcome of the war is decided.
4) In Syria, French resistance can hardly be maintained permanently either with or without our help.
5) An attack on Egypt before autumn is out of the question altogether. I consider it necessary, however, taking into account the whole situation, to give thought to the development of an operational unit in Tripoli itself which can, if necessary, also be launched against the west. Of course, Duce, the strictest silence must be maintained with regard to these ideas, for otherwise we cannot expect France to continue to grant permission to use her ports for the transportation of arms and munitions.
6) Whether or not America enters the war is a matter of indifference, inasmuch as she supports our opponent with all the power she is able to mobilize.
7) The situation in England itself is bad; the provision of food and raw materials is growing steadily more difficult. The martial spirit to make war, after all, lives only on hopes. These hopes are based solely on two assumptions: Russia and America. We have no chance of eliminating America. But it does lie in our power to exclude Russia. The elimination of Russia means, at the same time, a tremendous relief for Japan in East Asia, and thereby the possibility of a much stronger threat to American activities through Japanese intervention.
I have decided in these circumstances, as I already mentioned, to put an end to the hypocritical performance of the Kremlin. I assume, that is to say, I am convinced, that Finland, and likewise Rumania, will forthwith take part in this conflict, which will ultimately free Europe, for the future also, of a great danger. General Marras informed us that you, Duce, wish also to make available at least one corps. If you have that intention, Duce – which I naturally accept with a heart filled with gratitude – the time for carrying it out will still be sufficiently long, for in this immense theater of war the troops cannot be assembled at all points at the same time anyway. You, Duce, can give the decisive aid, however, by strengthening your forces in North Africa, also, if possible, looking from Tripoli toward the west, by proceeding further to build up a group which, though it be small at first, can march into France in case of a French violation of the treaty; and finally, by carrying the air war and, so far as it is possible, the submarine war, in intensified degree, into the Mediterranean.
So far as the security of the territories in the west is concerned, from Norway to and including France, we are strong enough there – so far as army troops are concerned – to meet any eventuality with lightning speed. So far as the air war on England is concerned, we shall, for a time, remain on the defensive – but this does not mean that we might be incapable of countering British attacks on Germany; on the contrary, we shall, if necessary, be in a position to start ruthless bombing attacks on British home territory. Our fighter defense, too, will be adequate. It consists of the best squadrons that we have.
As far as the war in the east is concerned, Duce, it will surely be difficult, but I do not entertain a second’s doubt as to its great success. I hope, above all, that it will then be possible for us to secure a common food supply base in the Ukraine for some time to come, which will furnish us such additional supplies as we may need in the future. I may state at tins point, however, that, as far as we can tell now, this year’s German harvest promises to be a very good one. It is conceivable that Russia will try to destroy the Rumanian oil region. We have built up a defense that will – or so I think – prevent the worst. Moreover, it is the duty of our armies to eliminate this threat as rapidly as possible.
If I waited until this moment, Duce, to send you this information, it is because the final decision itself will not be made until 7:00 o’clock tonight. I earnestly beg you, therefore, to refrain, above all, from making any explanation to your Ambassador at Moscow, for there is no absolute guarantee that our coded reports cannot be decoded.
I, too, shall wait until the last moment to have my own Ambassador informed of the decisions reached.
The material that I now contemplate publishing gradually, is so exhaustive that the world will have more occasion to wonder at our forbearance than at our decision, except for that part of the world which opposes us on principle and for which, therefore, arguments are of no use.
Whatever may now come, Duce, our situation cannot become worse as a result of this step; it can only improve. Even if I should be obliged at the end of this year to leave 60 or 70 divisions in Russia, that is only a fraction of the forces that I am now continually using on the eastern front. Should England nevertheless not draw any conclusions from the hard facts that present themselves, then we can, with our rear secured, apply ourselves with increased strength to the dispatching of our opponent. I can promise you, Duce, that what lies in our German power, will be done.
Any desires, suggestions, and assistance of which you, Duce, wish to inform me in the contingency before us, I would request that you either communicate to me personally or have them agreed upon directly by our military authorities.
In conclusion, let me say one more thing, Duce. Since I struggled through to this decision, I again feel spiritually free. Tire partnership with the Soviet Union, in spite of the complete sincerity of the efforts to bring about a final conciliation, was nevertheless often very irksome to me, for in some way or other it seemed to me to be a break with my whole origin, my concepts, and my former obligations. I am happy now to be relieved of these mental agonies.
With hearty and comradely greetings,
Your
[Адольф Гитлер; на архивной копии не стоит подписи]
Your Highness:
After the German Government had attempted in 1939, through clarification of the mutual spheres of interest, to bring about a relaxation of tension with Soviet Russia, and, if possible, even a friendly cooperation with her, it became nevertheless evident shortly afterward that no essential change in the attitude and tendencies of that Government toward other countries had taken place. On the contrary: Already the occupation of the Baltic countries was undertaken with the insulting justification that they had to be taken under Soviet Russia’s protection against a threat from without. And this happened although it was known to the Russian Government that Germany had rejected the earnest plea of Lithuania to send German troops to that country. The Russian attack upon Finland was also a hard blow to the sensibilities of the German people. The attempt of the Soviet Union to penetrate into the Balkans would have led to a dangerous threat not only to German vital interests but to those of the whole of Europe.
On the occasion of the visit to Berlin of Molotov, who had been invited in order that an attempt might again be made to bring about a clarification, the latter addressed a number of questions, or rather, demands to me to which it was impossible for me to assent. They dealt with problems ranging all the way from Finland to the Dardanelles. After the failure of these conversations not only did estrangement set in very quickly between our two countries, but, above all, the military threat to the German eastern frontiers grew increasingly stronger.
About 160 Soviet Russian divisions were concentrated in this area. Despite my confidence in the efficiency of the German transportation system, I was likewise forced in these circumstances slowly to order and carry out strong measures of defense. In the past few weeks the tension became unbearable. It was obviously the goal of the Russian Government and of its measures to tie down such large German forces in the east that our ability to carry on operations in other theaters of war would be obstructed or at least crippled. Thus time was passing and it was then up to England, or to England and Russia, to decide on the moment when they could seize the initiative from us.
All other measures or statements of the Kremlin were merely phrases to conceal this purpose. Since in recent weeks and especially in the last few days border incidents continued to increase and finally led to bigger and bigger conflicts, I do not believe that I can assume responsibility any longer for continuing to watch idly this slow but sure strangulation of the Reich.
Since this morning extensive defense measures have been taking place along a front that extends practically from the Arctic Ocean to the Black Sea. I am conscious of the gravity of the task but I also believe that I am at the same time acting in the spirit of the whole of European civilization and culture in trying to repel and push back this un-European influence.
How well-founded our view and our decision indeed are, Your Highness will see from those documents that I have now decided to release for publication.
As far as the attitude of Hungary is concerned, Your Highness, I am convinced that in her national consciousness she will appreciate my attitude. I should like at this point to thank Your Highness for the understanding measures of the Hungarian armed forces, which by the mere fact of having strengthened their frontier defenses will prevent Russian flank attacks and tie down Russian forces.
Whatever the immediate consequences of this event may be, the remote ones will surely result in a pacification of Europe and, above all. in the possibility of concentrating all the military forces of the German Reich for the ultimate annihilation of the opponent, who refuses peace only out of sheer lust for war.
Please accept, Your Highness, at this hour my especially cordial and comradely greetings!
Yours,
[Адольф Гитлер; на архивной копии не стоит подписи]
Multex No. 401 of June 21
(1) Rome to be dispatched June 22 – 3:00 a. m.
(2) Tokyo " June 22 – 3: 00 a. m.
(3) Helsinki " June 22 – 3: 00 a. m.
(4) Budapest " June 22 – 3:00 a. m.
(5) Bucharest " June 22 – 3; 00 a. m.
(6) Ankara " June 22 – 3: 00 a. m.
(7) Madrid " June 22 – 4:00 a. m.
(8) Sofia 66 " June 22 – 4: 00 a. m.
(9) Bratislava " June 22 – 4:00 a. m.
(10) Zagreb " June 22 – 4:00 a. m.
(11) Tehran " June 22 – 4: 00 a. m.
(12) Kabul " June 22 – 4: 00 a. m.
For the Chief of Mission personally.
I request that –
to 1-6: in the early morning hours of Sunday, June 22;
to 7-1as soon as you receive this telegram –
you call on the Foreign Minister there and inform him orally as follows:
In view of the constantly increasing threat to the Reich by the massed concentration of the Red Army on our frontier, the Reich Government has been impelled to counter this threat with all the means at its disposal. The considerations which led to this decision are set forth in a memorandum handed to the Soviet Ambassador in Berlin by the Reich Foreign Minister on the morning of June 22, which will subsequently be made public.
Briefly summarized, this memorandum states as follows:
[Here follows the summary declaration drafted for the Ambassador in Moscow to be read to Molotov. See the text enclosed within brackets in the draft telegram of June 21 to Moscow, document No. 659.]
Report by telegram on how your step is received.
Record of the Conversation Between the Foreign Minister and
Ambassador Alfieri
June 22, 1941, at 4:00 a. m.
The Foreign Minister informed Alfieri that, he had just notified the Soviet Ambassador of the fact that, in view of the menacing attitude of Soviet Russia, Germany had been forced since this morning to take countermeasures. He added that hostilities between Germany and Russia had probably already broken out. He announced, moreover, that there would be a letter from the Führer to the Duce concerning these events.
The concentration of Russian troops along the German frontier had represented a threat to Germany, so that the Führer had decided to cut the Gordian knot. Germany had definite hopes of beating Russia within a short time.
The Foreign Minister then pointed out that lie had first advocated a policy of reconciliation with Russia since, despite the great ideological differences, he had hoped in this way to be able to settle the problems and difficulties pending between the two countries. The Bolshevist doctrine had, however, proved the stronger, and so for almost a year now, Russia had come to take a hostile attitude toward Germany. The turning point had been the Vienna Award and the Rumanian guarantee. Germany’s attitude on the question of Finland as well as in the matter of the Russian guarantee to Bulgaria and the Straits question had likewise influenced Soviet Russia in this anti-German course.
Moreover, Germany also had proof that Russia had entertained relations with England. Thus the threat had become so serious that countermeasures had to be taken without delay. The fight would be a hard one. It would by no means be a case of a mere military demonstration. But in the end Germany would win anyway. And once the war against Russia had been won, a big step would have been taken toward final victory.
Alfieri listened to these communications with interest and replied merely that he, too, firmly believed in the victory of Germany over Russia.
The Charge d'Affaires in Italy to the Foreign Ministry
Rome, June 22,1941 – 6:40 a. m.
[...]
In accordance with instructions, I called at 3: 00 o’clock this morning on Count Ciano in his private apartment, since the Duce is absent from Rome, and handed him the Führer’s letter to the Duce,2 delivered to me by special courier. Count Ciano read the letter through carefully and I assisted him in the translation; he then explained to me that in view of the importance of its contents, he considered it necessary to inform the Duce of the contents over the direct telephone line to the Duce that he had at his disposal. The telephone conversation between Count Ciano and the Duce took place in my presence, and the Duce asked, after Count Ciano had given him a resume of the substance of the letter, that I be informed as follows, for transmission to Berlin:
Because of the desire of the Duce to receive the complete text of the letter as soon as possible, he instructed Count Ciano to transmit the text to him at once on his secret teletypewriter. In this way he would come into possession of the document much sooner than through delivery of the letter by plane.
The Minister in Hungary to the Foreign Ministry Telegram
Budapest, June 22,1941 – 11:55 a. m.
At 10:30 a.m. I handed the Regent the Führer’s letter. The Regent thanked me very much for transmitting this communication, which he called wonderful. For 22 years he had longed for this day, and was now delighted. Centuries later humanity would be thanking the Führer for this deed. One hundred and eighty million Russians would now be liberated from the yoke forced upon them by 2 million Bolshevists. This decision by the Führer would bring about peace, since England and the United States would now have to realize that Germany could no longer be defeated militarily and with possession of the rich raw material and agricultural areas of Russia was secure with respect to military economy and food supplies.
In telegram No. 679 sent earlier on June 22 ( 93/103731) Erdmannsdorff had reported Minister President Bardossy’s reaction to the communication made in accordance with Multex No. 401 of June 21 (document No. 663). Bardossy stated “that the Hungarian Government, in accordance with its attitude toward the Bolshevist menace which had been known for a long time, not only had full understanding for the German decision but felt the greatest possible satisfaction because of it.”
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler
Rome, June 23,1941
Führer: On the occasion of our talk on the Brenner on June I gave you my views regarding Russia and told you that the Russian question now called for a radical solution: either a military alliance or war. You explained to me that the former solution was out of the question because Stalin could never forget the failure of his policy in the Danube-Balkan area, and because the agreement with Belgrade, which he concluded in the eleventh hour, had revealed his true intentions. Consequently there remained only the second solution and with respect to it there was only one problem, that of timing. From what you have said in your proclamation to the German people I am convinced that any further postponement of the solution by the use of arms, for which there is now no alternative, would have imperiled our cause. Here, too, the knot had to be cut.
I fully appreciate that your decision must have been preceded by long reflection, because the war against Russia is primarily a struggle against the breadth of space. But all those who would point to historical precedents should be reminded that today the motors of tanks and airplanes, and the extraordinary maneuvering skill of both your generals and your soldiers, have overcome space.
The solution of the Russian problem results, I believe, in the following advantages:
Everything I have said will show you, Führer, what enthusiastic approval your decision to take Russia by the throat has met with in Italy and especially among the old guard of the party, which would have accepted only with a heavy heart any other solution of the problem. In a war of this nature Italy cannot remain on the sideline. I therefore thank you, Führer, for having accepted the participation of Italian ground and air forces, in numbers and for a sector yet to be determined by the General Staff. At the same time every effort will be made to consolidate our position in North Africa, both in the west, to watch Weygand, and in the east, in order to forestall any British attempt at a counterthrust – an attempt, moreover, which is unlikely after the latest severe defeat of the English Army. Concurrently we shall do everything in our power – notwithstanding the enormous transport difficulties – in order to prepare the 10 to 12 divisions necessary for an offensive against Egypt. This attack cannot be undertaken until late autumn after Tobruk has been captured.
As regards the various states, Führer, Turkey is an extremely important card in our game. If Turkey should permit the passage of our troops so that they could attack Egypt from the east as well,, Egypt’s fate would be sealed and the backbone of the British Empire broken. The resulting consequences for the British East, as far as India, would be incalculable. In this estimate of Turkey’s significance it gave me deep satisfaction to take note of the recent conclusion of the German-Turkish accord,6 and I have formally proposed to the Turkish Government the conclusion of an analogous or even stronger accord, if acceptable to Ankara.
[....]
Great Britain-United States. Mr. Roosevelt cannot do us more damage than he has done already, even if he formally declares war on us. The declaration of war would therefore have the purpose of giving a lift to morale in England, which is at present very depressed. However, the effect of such a stimulant would be of short duration.
Before closing this letter, Führer, I should like to say the following to you:
In this conviction, which is for me a certainty, I ask you, Führer, to accept my always sincere and comradely salutations.
Mussolini
Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
Führer’s Headquarters
June 30, 1941
Duce:
First of all, please let me thank you cordially for your last letter. I am overjoyed that our views in the great questions affecting the destinies of our people coincide so completely. I believe that the past week – from a political point of view- – has given striking confirmation to our opinions. What I myself at the first, moment did not even dare to hope for has happened. Large parts of Europe have been roused from a truly lethargic disinterestedness. Many countries now find themselves obliged in this, our battle against Bolshevism, to take an attitude that will be the beginning of a better understanding of our common policy which, in the last analysis, is a truly European one.
The struggle which has now been raging for a week, Duce, already makes it possible for me to give you a general picture in a few strokes and to tell you of our experiences.
The most important realization that I and my generals have gained is, despite all our suspicions, the positively alarming one, Duce, that if this battle, had not come now, but only a few months, not to speak of a year later, we would – however horrible the thought may be – have lost the war!
The Russian Army was about to complete a troop concentration with resources far in excess of what we knew or had even considered possible. For 8 days now one armored brigade after another has been attacked, beaten or annihilated – and despite this there seems to be almost no decrease either in their numbers or in the ferocity of their attack. Only since June 27 have we had the feeling that things are easing up, that the foe is slowly tiring, and that in spots there are signs of disintegration. Like the English with their Mark II infantry tank the Russians came here with a surprise of which we unfortunately had no idea at all. A monster tank, weighing some 52 tons, with the best of armor, 75 mm. thick, a 7.6 cm. gun, and three machine guns. Without our new 5 cm. antitank gun, the 8.8 antiaircraft gun, as well as the new armor-piercing grenades of our field artillery, even we would be powerless against this tank which is surely the strongest at present in existence.
The Russians had stationed two huge offensive armies in the large pocket of Bialystok as well as in that of Lwow. Numerous motorized and armored units were assigned to the infantry divisions, almost all of which, however, had their own armored units. We executed a flank attack on these two armies after breaking through extremely deep fortifications, which in some places are hardly inferior to those of the West Wall. The battles that have been taking place here for the past 8 days are among the most difficult that German troops have thus far had to experience. The Russians fight with a truly stupid fanaticism. On the first day there were hardly any prisoners at all. It was a struggle to the death in which numerous Russian officers and especially commissars in the end escaped threatened capture by suicide. Pillbox crews whose position was hopeless chose to blow themselves up rather than surrender. The Russian counterattacks did not take place in accordance with any general plan, but rather with the primitive brutality of an animal that sees itself trapped and then in wild rage beats against the walls of its cage. These soldiers, who are very stolid to begin with, have, in addition, been insanely incited. Their commissars tell them that if they are captured, they will be tortured and then killed anyway. They therefore fight to the last ditch, and if the worst comes, prefer their own death to the torments they have been made to believe in. Only in the last few days of battle has this morale begun to waver and the number of prisoners and deserters is now, to be sure, increasing by the hour.
Almost all Russian counterattacks are made with tanks only. After being attacked by 100 to 200 tanks, which individual divisions have often shot up in one day, the latter are again attacked by new tanks the next morning. I believe, Duce, that Europe was threatened with a danger here, of the gravity of which no one, unfortunately, had any proper conception.
The Russian Air Force is bad. Fanatically as the Russian fights as a land soldier, he has always been inept as a seaman, and apparently now also as a flier. As far as the Russian Air Force is concerned, the German fliers have wrought terrific havoc even in the first 7 days. Here the superiority is now not only unmistakable but absolute. Russian planes still try only occasionally to reach the front. In general, every such flight is also the last.
The Russian infantry are thrown into the battle in tremendous numbers, regardless of the sacrifice involved. Machine guns, mortars, infantry guns, and hand grenades cause terrible losses. Despite this the attacks are repeated again and again at very short intervals.
Russian leadership is, on the whole, bad. One exception to this, at least in the first few days, was the Russian Southern Army. The leadership of the individual divisions or regiments is not in accordance with any military standards. The training of the so-called officers is in no way comparable to the requirements in European nations. Nevertheless it is impossible to tell whether in the course of years an improvement might not perhaps have taken place in this respect also. But in view of the brutality of this type of warfare, the value of the individual is not so important from the very outset as the danger of the instrument in itself. This danger lies in the tremendous number of units, the enormous development of the tank arm, the stolid fanaticism of the individual soldier, as well as the complete indifference with which the leaders themselves sacrifice men and materials.
When I now report quite briefly on the outcome of the struggles, Duce, naturally only the external gains are to be seen at the moment, while the internal state of the now battered Russian units still remains concealed from us for the present. After an 8-day campaign we have the following situation:
North of the Pripet Marshes – these divide the zone of operations for the time being into the northern half, the Baltic States, and White Russia, and the southern half, Galicia and Bessarabia – the enemy's armies massed near the border are already completely beaten. In the pockets formed along the front of the Central Army Group two armies are enclosed by the rapid advance of armored wedges between Bialystok and Minsk, while other mobile forces are already pushing to the east over the Berezina.
In front of the Northern Army Group the enemy, after having suffered heavy losses between the border and the Drina, is trying to save the remnants of his northern armies through a retreat to the northeast. Daugavpils and Riga are in the hands of the German armored forces.
In southern Finland Field Marshal Mannerheim, to whom I am also sending a German division via Sweden, is deployed on both sides of Lake Ladoga, ready to attack starting July 2. In central and northern Finland German-Finnish forces have the mission to attack eastward and block off Murmansk, which is of importance as a launching point for possible English or American assistance.
South of the Pripet Marshes the armored group of the Southern Army Group is advancing in the general direction of Zhitomir, while the enemy on both sides of Lwow is trying to escape the threat of encirclement by withdrawing to the east. It may well be the intention of the Soviet Russians to reach their old line of fortifications and there to put up resistance. I therefore plan – in order to facilitate the frontal drive from the west – to have the Eleventh Army, which is concentrated in Rumania, together with the attached Rumanian forces, attack the line of Red fortifications from the rear, over the Pruth, early in July.
On the Carpathian front, Hungary is preparing to advance with a mobile corps against Kolomyya and Stanislawow. Advance units have already crossed the border.
The enemy’s air force units have already sustained such losses that our supremacy in the air is complete. The Luftwaffe can therefore be withdrawn in increasing measure from fighting the enemy’s air force and utilized for direct support of the Army.
The Red Navy has so far remained passive both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea.
I accept with thanks your generous offer, Duce, to dispatch an Italian corps and Italian fighter pilots to the eastern war theater. The fact that our allied armies are marching side by side precisely against the Bolshevist world enemy seems to me a symbol of the war of liberation that you and I have waged.
[...]
I close this long letter by greeting you most cordially, Duce, as an old comrade.
Fuhrer:
To begin with, I should like to thank you heartily for the letter you sent me informing me of the progress of the initial phase of the operations against Russia. The bulletins issued by your High Command on Sunday, June 29, have strengthened my conviction, which I expressed in my last letter to you, that the campaign against Russia will culminate in a triumph of your arms. The space is no obstacle to maneuvering units such as yours, but rather an advantage.
I was aware that the military organization of the Soviet Union had made remarkable progress in these past years, but what you tell me is a surprise to me also. It appears clear that this mighty military organization, not being able to be with us, would have been against us when the time came. It is therefore necessary and foresighted to eliminate it, so as to deprive Great Britain of all hope of aid from the European Continent. The marshaling of the European nations against Russia with regular and volunteer troops is actually a marshaling against Great Britain, which has allied herself with the Kremlin. This is very important for the future development of the war and for American intervention, which in my opinion has been postponed. After Russia’s liquidation, Great Britain’s fate will soon be decided, particularly if we should succeed in drawing Turkey over to our side and attacking Egypt from two sides.
As regards the sending of the Italian Army Corps, the three divisions are ready and can depart as soon as the timetable has been established by the proper authorities.
I accept with pleasure your proposal for a meeting at your Headquarters and am of the opinion that, morally as well as politically, such a meeting will rouse a wide response in both our countries and in the rest of the world. The task of beating Russia in order to extirpate Bolshevism is truly epic, and to have dared to do this will be the imperishable glory of your armies and the Axis revolution.
I want you, Führer, in this great hour of your life and of the history of your people, to feel that I am with you in comradeship and faith.
Mussolini
Duce:
Now that the fourth week since the beginning of the war in the east has come to an end, I should like, Duce, to give you a brief summary of the situation as it appears to me.
I read your last letter with hearty pleasure. I share your political views entirely, Duce. Some important new problems have now arisen that I should like to refer to briefly :
[...]
After the first breakthrough had been initiated for the destruction of a number of Russian armies, as well as the smashing of or attack on numerous Russian divisions, some time passed, in order
In the latter field particularly a tremendous amount has been achieved. Numerous Russian railroads are again operating, other lines are in process of having the gauge changed, that is, our supply trains are already advancing on the German gauge to far east of Minsk. These lines will in a few days, despite all the destruction, already have reached or crossed the so-called Stalin Line. After these preparations were made, and the infantry divisions had caught up with the motorized units ahead of them, I gave the order to attack the Stalin Line and to break through at the places foreseen. This operation succeeded along the entire front. At the moment there are trapped Russian units or armies at eight, places along our front. The noose is being drawn tighter almost hourly, and I do not believe that any considerable portions can succeed in breaking through. It will then probably take 8 days again before the mass of our infantry will have followed the armored units which will have pushed far to the east. But I estimate that by the end of next week large portions of the Russian armies that were previously stationed at the Stalin Line will be destroyed. Further actions of annihilation are now being started. They will follow very shortly.
I already consider it entirely out of the question that the Russian Command will succeed in bringing any considerable force back across the Volga or even behind the Urals. At any rate I am determined to pursue the Russian Army until it is entirely destroyed and annihilated.
This resolve is also shared by the troops. This hard resolve was born under the influence of the horror that Bolshevism has only now revealed to us; for the power against which we are fighting here, consists not of people, but of devils. Every day the conviction grows, both among officers and men, that we stepped in at the last possible moment to combat a danger that threatened Europe to a degree unsurpassed since the Hun or Mongol invasions. The atrocities that are perpetrated by these beasts defy the imagination. My Leibstandarte, for example, came upon an advance detachment of the armored group Kleist, which had hurried far ahead, been cut off, and finally, after all its ammunition gave out, had been overpowered. They were found, all tied up, in a condition so horrible that the photographs cannot be circulated even in Germany. The consequence of these impressions is a growing fanaticism, even among our own soldiers, who prefer not to take prisoners at all any more. What we do find here in the way of prisoners is – whether enlisted man or officer – so brutalized and unspeakably debased that again there emerges the sharp boundary line between Europe and Central Asia, as distinguished from the Far East, from those old highly cultivated races, that is, who for thousands of years had to defend themselves laboriously in bloody battles against Mongol Asia.
[...]
This time, even more than before, I am convinced that the war is won; for after the annihilation of Russia, there will be no power in the world, Duce, that can shake our European or your North African position. Aside from this, however, we shall succeed in guaranteeing out of the immeasurable expanse of the eastern area, those basic economic conditions that would be calculated, even if the war lasts very long, to free the rest of Europe from its ever-present want and its attendant anxiety.
Please accept, Duce, my heartiest and comradely greetings,
Your
[Адольф Гитлер, архивная копия не подписана]
The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry Telegram
Rome, July 26,1941 – 1: 50 a. m.
For the Reich Foreign Minister personally.
Translation of the letter of July 24 of the Duce to the Führer.
Führer: I lose no time in replying to your last letter and, following your example, I make a survey of the situation.
[...]
I have read with the keenest interest what you, Führer, have written, me about the campaign in Russia, and about the races of which the Bolshevist Army is composed. Precisely because of its heterogeneous composition, because of the disorganization in its command and because of the bestial stupidity of the people, I have the mathematical conviction that your armies will rapidly destroy the Russian armies, which have already been severely weakened.
As my generals tell me, the Italian Army Corps will be able to go into action between the 10th and 15th of August. Meanwhile, however, I am preparing a second Army Corps, and I could, if necessary, prepare also a third. There are men enough. As far as their “morale” is concerned, it is very good, and their bravery is indisputable, provided they are well armed and well led. General Rommel will, I believe, have informed you what our divisions are doing around Tobruk and in this connection it should be noted that many of these men have been living in the desert uninterruptedly for 15 to 20 months.
I, too, Führer, earnestly desire to see you again. That I will be able to do after the 10th of August, and I am prepared to come to your headquarters in former Russian territory. I need have no scruples about, leaving Italy for the Italian people are quietly at work and believe more than ever in victory.
Please accept, Führer, my cordial and comradely greetings and the expression of my undying friendship. Mussolini.
In his first conversation with the Duce immediately after the latter’s arrival at Headquarters,2 the Führer gave the Duce a general outline of the situation, together with a detailed account of the military developments.
The Führer began by acknowledging to the Duce that it had been a wise decision to liquidate Greece along with Yugoslavia before launching the Russian campaign. Greece and Yugoslavia were in reality two potential and active enemies of the Axis, and eliminating them in time proved a great advantage at the moment when it became necessary to take action against Soviet Russia in order to eliminate the grave Bolshevik menace and to achieve effective control of Europe.
The Führer then made a special point of acknowledging that for the first time since the beginning of the conflict, the German military intelligence service had failed. It had in fact not reported that Russia had a very well armed and equipped army composed for the most part of men imbued with a veritable fanaticism who, despite their racial heterogeneity, were now fighting with blind fury. The Bolshevik army as a whole could be viewed as made up of two large masses: one, the larger, consisting of peasants who fought with unreasoning obstinancy, and the other made up in the main of industrial workers who strongly believed in the words of Marx and fought with fanaticism. For opposite reasons, both were fighting to the last man; the former out of primitive ignorance, the latter because they were bewitched by the mystique of Communism.
The Führer added that he would not let himself be ensnared by the Soviets into continuing the battle inside cities by street fighting, for which the Russians were exceptionally well prepared. He had no intention of destroying the large cities, but would leave them to fall by themselves after he had won the battle of annihilation against the Soviet military forces emplaced around them. That was his plan for Leningrad, which had an urban area comprising about 4 million inhabitants. It would fall as soon as the total destruction of the Soviet forces ringing the city was accomplished. By avoiding street fighting, which yields no useful results, he would above all be able to save important forces.
The Führer had no doubt whatsoever as to the outcome of the struggle. He thought there was no point at the moment in dwelling on a consideration of what might at some future date become a line of resistance set up by the Soviets; he was inclined to believe that the Red military strength would inevitably collapse not later than October under the incessant blows that were being, and would be, inflicted upon them. A contributing factor, as time went on, would be the conquest, already begun and soon to be completed, of the major Soviet industrial centers and mining regions, for example the Don river basin. Whether this collapse would come soon, within a few months, or next spring, could be considered of secondary importance because already the means of victory were in Germany’s hands. Inasmuch as the German losses to date, despite the fierceness of the struggle, had not exceeded the low figure of 68,000 men, and the war booty that had fallen into German hands was so immense, far exceeding the needs of the armed forces of the Reich, the Führer had decided to concentrate the production effort from now on exclusively on the construction of submarines, tanks, and antiaircraft artillery.
Regarding military plans for the future, the Führer told the Duce – in absolute secrecy – that after completion of the Russian campaign he intended to deal England the final blow by invading the island. To that end he was now marshaling the necessary resources by preparing the appropriate naval and land material needed for the landing. In the opinion of the Führer, that would mark the final act of the conflict.
Concerning France. The Führer held that there would be no point in dealing with that problem while the battle was still in progress in Russia. He had found justification for his feeling of distrust of the French, whom he was watching carefully and with respect to whom he intended to maintain a negative attitude. The French question would be taken up again at the end of the war.
Reverting to the Russian campaign, the Führer stated that the grain harvest in the Ukraine had in large part fallen into German hands. It should be borne in mind, however, that next year’s Russian harvest must be used chiefly to supply the occupied countries. The Führer repeated his praise of the Finnish troops, who had fought admirably, and he had words of praise also for the Rumanians, the Hungarians, and the Italians. Referring to these last, he said they had acquitted themselves in brilliant fashion in their first engagements.
The Führer’s remarks were delivered in an orderly and precise manner, which conveyed an impression of absolute calm and serenity. It was for this reason, among others, that the Duce thought it appropriate to let the Führer develop his thoughts without interruption, and postpone to a subsequent conversation the specific questions he wanted to ask concerning the progress of the military operations and certain territorial problems.
II
In the course of the second conversation which the Duce had with the Führer on the evening of August 25, the Duce set forth his views on certain questions of major importance.
[...]
United States: [...] The Führer gave a detailed analysis of the Jewish clique surrounding Roosevelt and exploiting the American people. He stated that he would not for anything in the world live in a country like the United States, which had a concept of life inspired by the most vulgar commercialism and had no feeling for any of the most sublime expressions of the human spirit, such as music.
[...]
Italian participation in the campaign in Russia: The Duce expressed to the Führer his ardent desire for the Italian Armed Forces to participate in the operations against the Soviets on a larger scale. Italy, the Duce stated, has an abundance of manpower and could send an additional six, nine, and even more divisions. The Führer replied that he greatly appreciated that offer and thanked the Duce heartily. He added, however, that the great distance of the Russian front from Italy and the logistical difficulties would cause a serious problem with respect to transportation and the proper functioning of large masses of military forces. The Duce affirmed on his part that Italy could render a major contribution to the war effort against Russia, and suggested that further contingents of Italian troops be used to take the place of German troops sent on leave. The Führer took note of this proposal, which would be given further study, and touched upon the possibility of employing the Italian troops in the Ukraine, where the average winter temperature as a rule does not go lower than six degrees below zero [centigrade].
The Führer finally drove home once more the point he had already made in his preceding conversation, namely, that he did not intend to wage a war of destruction or of prestige; but a war of annihilation of the enemy armed forces in order to liberate Germany and Europe from the recurrent threat of conflict and create the necessary basis for constructing the new European order. He concluded by expressing his very keen desire, once the war was ended, to come to Italy and spend some time in Florence, the city he preferred above all others for the harmony of its art and the beauty of its natural surroundings.
This project was enthusiastically received by the Duce, who immediately invited the Führer to come to Florence, once the war was over, and assured him of the affection and friendship with which the Italian people would welcome him again as their most honored guest.
After a word of thanks for the granting of an interview, Alfieri pointed out that his visits to headquarters always coincided with the receipt of some good news. Thus he had heard this morning in Konigsberg of the fall of Odessa and he was glad that in this way a good atmosphere had, as it were, been created for his visit.
The Foreign Minister replied that things had in the main developed as he had predicted in previous conversations with Alfieri. The Russian campaign was practically won and was coming to an end. It was now only a matter of destroying certain scattered units of Russians in the area facing the German military forces. The Russians could no longer form a strongly cohesive front. By and large, the future military operations therefore involved simply a mopping up of the area, which the German troops would also occupy, even if it was to be expected that now and then pockets of Russian troops would still have to be cleaned out.
Germany had proceeded in a thoroughly systematic way in her operations so far. Of the three Russian armies, Voroshilov had been encircled in Leningrad; Budenny was ground to pieces at Kiev and Melitopol, while the central army, under Timoshenko, was now going to its destruction.
At the present moment, when the Russians could neither form a strong front nor possessed cohesive armies, they could no longer offer any effective resistance to the German armies, which were advancing along the entire front. In future battles it would therefore only be a case of local nests of resistance at important points which would still have to be overcome.
One thing was certain, however: Germany would, as he (the Foreign Minister) had predicted to Alfieri previously, fully attain her goal this very year; that is, obtain possession of the centers of industry and raw materials of the European-Russian area in the broadest sense.
To a remark by Alfieri to the effect that he had to note with complete admiration that this result had been achieved within the brief span of 4 months, the Foreign Minister replied that in any case one felt better now than if nothing had been attempted in 1941.
With the liquidation of Russia the last potential ally of the English on the European Continent had been eliminated. Even if the regime of Stalin should stand – nothing final could as yet be said on this, however – it would no longer be possible for Stalin to raise a new army in Siberia; for he would no longer have enough people available, if one considered that in the Siberian area the population was disproportionately smaller than in the European part of Russia. There would be no possibility, moreover, of the re-provisioning and re-equipping of an Army. It was because this state of affairs was clear to the Russians themselves that they were making such efforts to get English and American material help. Not much was to be expected of England because, according to the latest reports on hand, the state of Great Britain’s military equipment was so bad that the giving away of material to others was out of the question. The American rearmament hullabaloo was a big bluff, and the United States was not in a position to give much material to Russia. But even if American deliveries were available, the question of shipping space for the transportation of war materials to the vicinity of Russia would still have to be solved, and, even if this problem should, contrary to expectations, be solved, the question would arise whether the material would reach the Soviet Union itself from the areas near her. Germany would surely see to it that the supplies to Russia would be blocked. Practically, then, Stalin could not count on help from abroad. He would therefore have to try to cover his requirements from the remaining industrial area in the Urals. Here, too, Germany would see to it that these industrial installations did not remain intact, so that in this way Russia would, therefore, practically be lost to England as an ally.
That, too, was why they were having such a headache now in London. They realized in England that after the defeat of Russia by the states of the Tripartite Pact, Great Britain would confront in isolation a large part of the world. Her last hope was the United States, whose further conduct would be observed clearly and sharply by Germany. There was no reason, however, to worry about American possibilities. Rearmament would take many years yet. When it was completed the material would surely be old and antiquated. Neither with soldiers nor with the fleet could the United States accomplish anything. The only military help that she could give would be the sending of pilots and planes to England. This was opposed by the potential of the Axis Powers and their friends, as well as by that of the conquered enemies, which was infinitely greater than the potentials of England and America put together. In a renewed air duel between the British Isles and Europe, England would be in a much more unfavorable position than formerly.
England and America were now threatening constantly with control of the seas, but he (the Foreign Minister) thought that the states of the Tripartite Pact and their friends could so organize themselves economically in the huge spaces at their disposal that they would feel the effects of a very long war less than their foes.
Concerning further developments the Foreign Minister remarked that a small portion of the national forces now committed in the East would suffice to head off trouble-making by the Bolshevists in the future. Upon conclusion of the operations, a large portion of the German Army would therefore again be withdrawn from the east, The total energies of the huge European area would accordingly be devoted to the final battle against England, that is, to the construction of submarines and the expansion and improvement of the Luftwaffe.
In recapitulation it might be said that the year 1941 has not gone by unprofitably, because the political and diplomatic importance of the Powers of the Tripartite Pact has constantly been increasing particularly as a result of the most recent events. The results were already noticeable. Thus Japan had formed a new Cabinet, at the head of which stood the former Minister of War, Tojo. Although recent news was not available, it seemed quite obvious that the Army had prevailed in Japan, so that now Japan, too, would take a stiffer attitude than the compromise Cabinet of Konoye. Here, too, perhaps, interesting developments were in the offing.
Germany would, in any case, probably face the winter not only in a stronger, but in a completely unassailable position. She could not be beaten, either militarily or economically. That the peoples of the victorious Axis would probably be satisfied with their governments seemed to him (the Foreign Minister) obvious, even if the population and the soldiers had to endure temporary privation. Thus, the last and only hope of England would fade away. This completely false and foolish hope was that the peoples of the victorious Axis, after having conquered all other countries, would be in an unassailable position and would set out to garner the fruits of former and coming victories, yet would stage a revolution at home and capitulate abroad.
Alfieri replied that he had listened to the situation report of the Foreign Minister in its clarity and logic with great admiration and feeling. He felt constrained at this moment to press the hand of the Foreign Minister in order to give expression to these emotions. Alfieri, who had risen at these words, congratulated the Foreign Minister with a handshake and stated further that it must, to be sure, be a very special satisfaction to him if all the predictions made in the previous conversations were completely fulfilled in this way.
The Foreign Minister thanked Alfieri and spoke of the great tranquillity with which further developments were being awaited in Germany, particularly since Germany knew that victory could no longer be taken from her. Her foes, too, surely knew this by now. At any rate, Churchill and Roosevelt should have known it at their Atlantic meeting.
[...]
Finally [Alfieri] asked [...] that the Italian Senator Barzini, a well-known journalist and writer, be permitted to be present when the German troops entered Moscow. This request was seconded by Count Ciano.
After a few words of welcome the Führer expressed his satisfaction that the great aim of destroying the enemy forces in the east had now been attained to a great extent and it was merely a question of exploiting the victory in every direction.
[...]
He (the Führer) was not clear about the intentions of the English. It was certain, however, that Great Britain had lost her strongest ally on the Continent. In the light of the latest events in Russia, severe criticism was being voiced even in England itself regarding the inactivity of British warfare and British policy. The critics believed that in recent weeks the time had been favorable for unleashing a two-front war. The Führer stressed in this connection that Germany was very well prepared for a two-front war, and Lord Halifax had not betrayed anything new at all about England’s plan when he hinted at a two-front war. Germany had left strong forces both in Norway and in France, and was therefore armed for everything.
It was not known, however, whether the English were not going to do something somewhere after all. He (the Führer) would explain his opinion on this, too, in the letter to the Duce. He would speak of the danger points where Germany had already made her preparations, and on the basis of certain considerations would suggest that Italy undertake a reinforcement of the Luftwaffe in the Mediterranean in the near future. Furthermore, a new attempt should be made against Malta and in any case the island should be blockaded as thoroughly as possible and cut off from all imports. A long-range night fighter unit would have to watch over the three airports on Malta and in the long run they would be able to inflict considerable losses on the English fighters when they landed there at night. In this regard the best and most favorable possibilities of attack were offered at Malta.
Concerning the general situation the Führer remarked that the decision of the war had really been made by the events of the past 4 months, and that in any case there was no longer any possibility for the enemy to shake this decision. Probably the English could still try a few local operations; but they could not gain a continental victory.
They themselves were not in a position to attempt a landing on the Continent, to say nothing of carrying it through. However, they were also lacking in support from other quarters in executing such an operation. To be sure, Russia now could have given them tremendous help in their aggressive intentions, as one now recognized much more clearly than 5 months ago. By a sudden attack the Russians would have been in a position to give the war a disastrous turn, not only as regards Germany and Italy but in respect to all Europe and civilization.
The Soviet Union had now finally lost this possibility, and not only for geographical reasons, because the front was 1,500 kilometers from the eastern frontier of the Reich, but also for military reasons as regards both personnel and material and likewise for organizational reasons. In regard to personnel the giant state had sacrificed its most valuable units. So much material had been lost that the democracies could not replace it in 5 years, in which connection one should remember that they would then keep nothing for themselves. What was decisive, however, was the organizational disruption of the Russian state, regarding the amount and extent of which no one so far possessed any insight.
From the observations of the Turkish Ambassador in Moscow from the time before the battles at Vyazma and Briansk there already emerged a picture of the internal collapse of order and discipline. In a state in which the leadership was so centralized that, to express it crassly, even the distribution of toothbrushes – if such things were used in Russia at all – had to be regulated centrally by Moscow, it was naturally impossible to build up a new governmental center located hundreds of kilometers from the capital city. Even the establishment of the purely technical and communications apparatus was entirely impossible with the Russian colossus, so that after the abandonment of Moscow a central government and administration of the country would be a practical impossibility.
Just as impossible was a removal of industry to the east. Some branches of industry had already lost 75 percent of their raw material supplies. In addition, the remaining 25 percent were mainly distributed in an exceedingly unfavorable manner in relation to the railroads.
At any rate Germany, with her highly flexible economic system, would not be in a position in like circumstances to repair such damage as Russia had suffered. The same was probably true for other European industrial countries. Therefore France had also surrendered at a certain moment in the realization of this impossibility.
Now it was said that Stalin intended to transfer a million workers to Siberia. Certainly only a portion of these would arrive at their destination, and the workers would arrive in the middle of the Siberian winter with its temperatures of 15 to 50 degrees below freezing. They would not find any living quarters, but would have to be accommodated in caves in the earth. Thus this winter the fate of Napoleon would probably overtake Russia rather than Germany and her allies.
Furthermore, the Russian transportation system was not transverse, but radial. All lines radiated from Moscow, and the route between two points in the empire always led through the capital, which, however, would be under siege from all sides within a few weeks.
In southern Russia the further advance of the German and allied troops was above all a matter of supply. It was extremely important to repair the railroad network as quickly as possible and to change it to the European gauge so that the supply of fuel, food, and ammunition was secured as regards transportation. In this respect much progress can be noted. Today a large railroad bridge across the Dnieper near Kremenchug will be put into service, so that entire trains will run through to Stalino. What was decisive for the German advance in the south was not the hostile resistance, but the weather and the supply possibilities. As soon as freezing weather arrived and the now almost impassable roads had frozen over, the weather-determined obstacles could be more easily overcome; by crossing the huge barrier of the Dnieper at three bridge points a restoration of the railroad network and therewith an improvement in the possibilities of supplies would be attained which would permit the German army to accomplish the next jump forward. At the present distance of 400 to 500 kilometers of the front lines from the supply bases one had had to call a halt for the time being.
The Führer designated the Caucasus area as the next objective of the German operations, which was to be cut off together with the already interrupted pipeline and the railroad lines to the north. He (the Führer) would be glad if in this manner the German troops would come up against the first divisions of General Wavell and would thereby relieve the situation in the Mediterranean area. Such a relief would best be brought about if the Arab world would witness a really serious threat to the English position, no matter what the point was from which it was launched. The Caucasus area was a favorable basis for this in so far as the main center of oil supplies lay in its immediate vicinity, which could then be put to the service of the German and allied armies even if the Russians should undertake large-scale demolitions. Within 6 to 8 months everything could be repaired again, so that the strongest pressure could then be exerted on England from there.
In the further course of the conversation the Führer called to mind the large-scale strategic and operational plans which he had described to the Duce at his recent visit.* At that time he had said his aim was the destruction of Budenny’s army, which at that time was still northwest of Kiev, as well as a break-through and an encirclement of Timoshenko’s army. He had not wanted to write to the Duce before these plans had been realized. Today he could say that the operational ideas which he had expressed at that time had been carried out in a splendid manner. The armies of Budenny and Timoshenko had been destroyed; far more than iy2 million Russian prisoners had fallen into our hands.
As regards men Russia had lost more than 3 million prisoners since the start of the campaign. If one assumed that one to two dead must be counted for every prisoner, then one arrived at a total loss of 6 million in prisoners and dead. For every dead man one could assume two to three wounded, of these 60 percent were serious casualties, that is, soldiers who could not be in service within a short time; 30 to 40 percent could be assumed to be light casualties, but again 50 percent of these were eliminated because of bad sanitary organization.
From his calculations there emerged a total loss of the Russians of a minimum of 10 millions, and this was probably a very cautious estimate. In reality the figures would probably be higher. Furthermore, almost the entire commissioned and noncommissioned officers’ corps had been lost in this manner, and when an English newspaper wrote that Stalin intended to set up a new army in the Urals in accordance with the experience gained in the present war, this assertion could only call for a smile from everyone who knew from his own experience the difficulties involved in setting up an army. This was nothing more than a gigantic bluff.
The material losses of the Russians were unimaginable. Only now had it become clear what tremendous danger had threatened from Russia. The industrial damages were just as great and were impossible to repair. The removal of machine tools was a very doubtful undertaking, especially since the railroads were under constant bombardment from the German fliers. As the younger age groups were needed as industrial workers, the Russians were forced to call up mainly7 older age groups and use them for cannon fodder.
In raw materials Russia had already lost 75 percent of her aluminum supplies, 65-70 percent of her raw steel supplies, and a large part of her coal stocks. Within a short time she would no longer be able to exercise control over more than 90 percent of her oil supplies.
The supply of manganese was completely eliminated, not only for Russia but also for America, which had gotten supplies from Russian sources. Molybdenum had likewise been entirely eliminated. The remaining raw material bases lay so far apart from one another that a concentrated armament production was no longer possible.
Thus if one applied the present Russian situation to German conditions, one would arrive at the following picture: The Ruhr area and the Upper Silesian coal basin were lost, as well as the Central German steel industry; three-fourths of the aluminum industry, 90-95 percent of the armament factories, and 70 percent of the transportation facilities were eliminated. One no longer possessed an army and intended in these circumstances to set up a new army. This comparison showed in all clarity the hopeless situation in which the Soviet Union found itself. The difficulties were still enhanced by the fact that the thickly settled areas of Russia were in German hands, whereas of the 150 million total population only 30 million lived in Siberia.
One could therefore state that the giant empire of the Soviet Union had reached the end of its strength. Not only the Russians and the Germans, together with their allies, knew this, but also England and America. As proof of this the Führer cited the fact that the Americans wanted to route their deliveries to Russia neither through Vladivostok nor through Iran, but like typical Shylocks had chosen the harbor of Archangel because they knew very well that within a few weeks this would be unusable until next May as a result of ice formation. Then they could shift the blame onto Russia for the fact that the deliveries had not come off. For the Anglo-American experts themselves certainly did not assume that one could keep a channel open permanently with icebreakers, as was maintained in the Anglo-Saxon press. There was hardly a better target for air attacks than an icebreaker which, without any possibility of evasion, led the way laboriously through the masses of ice at a speed of three knots. Furthermore German troops would, within a few weeks, also cut the railroad to Archangel.
In these circumstances the war would be transferred to the west in the near future, and thereby the period of grace which England had received because of the Russian events would he ended. What conclusions the English themselves would draw from this could of course not be predicted. However, England’s internal situation did not seem to be so firm as it was previously. Within the framework of the fight against England the English harbors would within 1 to 2 months be bombarded in a way that they had so far not yet experienced, and the submarines would proceed with renewed vigor in the dark nights against the English shipping. At the same time an operation against England was under preparation in the Arab wox-ld, in which connection the problems in the Mediterranean, too, would be made easier, regarding which he (the Führer) would take a detailed position in his letter to the Duce.
Noteworthy in the fighting in the east was the fact that for the first time a feeling of European solidarity had developed. This was of great importance especially for the future. A later generation would have to cope with the problem of Europe-America. It would no longer be a matter of Germany or England, of Fascism, of National Socialism, or antagonistic systems, but of the common interests of Pan-Europe within the European economic area with her African supplements. The feeling of European solidarity, which at the moment was distinctly tangible, even though only faint against the background of the fighting in the east, would gradually have to change generally into a great recognition of the European community.
After a remark about Japan, whose hour at the side of the Axis would surely come, the Führer spoke of the practical possibilities that existed for America in her fight against the Continent. The United States was arming itself in order to take over as much as possible of the English legacy. It masked this intention behind a holy crusade against Fascism and National Socialism, a typically Anglo-Saxon procedure since the Anglo-Saxons always surround the pursuit of their own interests with an appearance of morality. In this connection it was significant that an American periodical stated a few days ago that England was exhausted to such a degree that America would have to take over the leadership of the world and the succession to the British international position. As counterservices for her deliveries of war material America really seemed to have made demands on England in this direction, which were evidently of such a serious nature that the English had so far not yet replied to them.
Apparently it was a question of the American demand to possess bases everywhere where the English for their part had bases, as well as the demand that England give up the economic protectionism of the British Empire, that is her Ottawa policy.
One often heard the opinion that at the end of the war England would have lost the fight, to be sure, but that America would step into her place. To this the observation was to be made that the United States had so far by no means mastered the problems of internal order and organization of social conditions that had been solved in Germany and Italy, and therefore at the end of the war would find herself confronted by great internal difficulties. If in addition Europe, led and held together by Germany in the north and Italy in the south, achieved a better cooperation between the European nations than in the past, it would then represent such a superior factor that even America could do nothing against a Europe thus unified. Then 500 million Europeans would confront 230 million Americans, whereby one should remember that there were only 60 million Anglo-Saxons in America, whereas the remainder was made up of Italians, Germans, and members of other races.
Central and South America would still provide America with aid during the war under the influence of Jewish propaganda, to be sure. As soon as peace had been established, however, such an economic chaos would arise there that a new orientation would be necessary. Since the South Americans wanted to sell the same products that the North Americans produce in great quantities, no healthy economic relations were possible between the two parts of the Western Hemisphere, particularly since the South Americans were not in a position to raise the means of payment for the finished goods to be obtained from North America, and one could not after all constantly exchange goods in return for unproductive gold.
In view of these facts of internal and external chaos in America, the war and its armaments were simply a period of grace for the United States, after the passage of which it would experience an economic collapse in comparison to which the crisis of 1929 would appear to be child’s play.
Therefore the future did not belong to the ridiculously half-civilized America, but to the newly arisen Europe that would also definitely prevail with her people, her economy, and her intellectual and cultural values, on condition that the East were placed in the service of the European idea and did not work against Europe. Therefore it was also a fallacy to believe that in the last analysis America would be the beneficiary of England’s defeat. The older culture and the higher intellectual level of Europe would in the end be victorious.
Count Ciano thanked the Führer for his comprehensive statements, and, following that, came to speak of Italy’s domestic situation. As was known, the English and American propaganda, which was connected with other propagandists that were under Jewish influence, had some time ago gone over to representing Italy’s domestic situation in the blackest colors. The Duce had commissioned him (Count Ciano) to state to the Führer in no uncertain terms that this prattle was absolutely absurd. Italy’s domestic situation had not changed by any means.
At most there was one somewhat delicate and difficult point: This was the food situation, especially in the area of bread grain. Here the scarcity of supply was disagreeably noticeable particularly for the reason that bread and cereals represented the staple of the Italian people. However, the Duce was convinced that he would be able to master the difficulties and by means of skillful distribution of the existing quantities would be able to compensate for the hardships of the poorer people by giving to the more well-to-do population groups, who had alternate possibilities, less bread than to die poor. To he sure, the situation was not exactly splendid. In the Duce’s opinion it would, however, be possible to get through to the next harvest. In any case no repercussions on domestic policy of any sort had arisen from these food difficulties. Italy’s internal situation was normal and calm; morale was good. The extent to which the Italian people understood the necessity to restrict themselves had been shown when shortly after introduction of the bread rationing the Duce had made a trip to the political center of Italy (Bologna, Parma, and other northern Italian cities) and had been welcomed there with great enthusiasm by the people.
In the further course of the conversation Count Ciano also passed on a personal request of the Duce’s to the Führer: Italy felt uncomfortable because she had the impression that she contributed too little to the military efforts in the conduct of the war. Therefore the Duce wanted Italy to participate in the military effort to a larger extent than heretofore.
In this connection Ciano came to speak of the question of Italian workers in Germany and admitted without further ado that certain individual difficulties had been dramatized unnecessarily. One needed only to go through the pages of newspapers of cities like Florence and Bologna, whose laboring population numbered about the same as the Italian workers employed in Germany, in order to find that there are incidents, fights, and the like every day which no one got excited about. The incidents in Germany were therefore something entirely normal and were simply exploited by malevolent people.
In these circumstances the inclination of the Duce could best be summarized in the words: “fewer workers, more soldiers.” Since in the choice of the workers mistakes had been made, the Duce intended to undertake a new selection to eliminate unsuitable elements and reduce the number of workers employed in Germany, but to increase the number of fighting soldiers. The Duce asked the Führer to permit him to make a larger contribution to the military effort than in the past if the operations against the Caucasus were to begin in the spring.
The Führer promised this, remarking that for climatic reasons Italian troops could perhaps do particularly good service in the areas situated south of the Caucasus.
Continuing, Ciano pointed out that a greater participation by Italy in the military conduct of the war would exercise a very important countereffect in relation to the Anglo-Saxon propaganda, which liked to characterize Italy’s position as entirely subordinate.
The Führer repeated his promise and remarked on the question of the workers that at certain times of scarcity egotistical elements often played a great role. Every category of worker watched to see that no one was allotted more than they themselves. Thus, for example, the German workers, too, had protested when the Italians had been granted a special allowance of wine.
Furthermore, there were naturally still elements among both the German and the Italian workers which were not a hundred percent Fascist or National Socialist. These elements sought to bring about conflicts which they motivated intentionally in another than an ideological way, for reasons of camouflage. There simply existed an international guild of chatterers and complainers who criticized everything as a matter of principle or because they had too little to do. The decisive thing, however, in relation to this was that the two revolutions, The Fascist and the National Socialist, stood alone in the world united with one another for better or for worse. The real Fascists and National Socialists had grasped this just as had the two leaders, so that every attempt at separating the two movements was condemned to failure from the very start.
Upon Ciano’s remark that perhaps the Alpini divisions could be employed for the fighting in the Caucasus, the Führer responded with words of appreciation for their fighting ability and remarked that perhaps Italian troops could also participate later in the fighting against India. In any case he (the Führer) would by spring get the English to the point that even if they had not entirely disappeared from the Mediterranean, they still would have to shift their aim elsewhere.
There followed the situation report by General Jodl and Major Christian in the map room in the presence of Count Ciano. This was in regard to the status of the operations on the eastern front, in the west, and in the area of revolt in the Balkans. When Ciano asked about the time of the capture of Petersburg or Moscow, the Führer replied that one could not say anything precise about this, but that both cities would be entirely encircled and cut off from all supplies.
When Ciano asked about the attitude of France, the Führer replied that the French continued their waiting attitude, though they had become considerably more polite in view of the German victories in Russia.
In response to a question of Ciano’s about the situation in French North Africa the Führer said that the conditions there would be uncertain as long as Weygand was still at the head of the administration there. There was a prospect, however, that he would soon be recalled.
In reply to a question by Ciano regarding Turkey the Führer pointed out that their attitude would be influenced by an advance in the Caucasus area.
Duce :
I am writing you this letter at a moment when I believe I can justifiably claim that the campaign in the east is not only won but as such has in the main been brought to a conclusive decision.
When I had the pleasure of welcoming you and your staff members at my headquarters, I informed you about the operations that were planned or in preparation. Completely misjudging the situation, the command of the Russian Southern Army Group waited until we had created the conditions necessary for closing the big arc around Kiev. This battle led to an outcome that exceeded even my expectations. For I expected 300,000 to 500,000 prisoners; after the conclusion of the last mopping-up operations, however, the number came to more than 700,000.
The ensuing penetration by the Kleist armored group to open the bridgehead around Dnepropetrovsk also gave your divisions, Duce, their first opportunity to carry out an operation of their own, with outstanding success, in the framework of a big new battle of extermination.
As expected, the attack carried forward in the meantime south of the Dnieper against the Crimea drew like a magnet the last remnants of the left wing of Budenny’s army between the Dnieper and Melitopol with the objective of plunging our Eleventh Army into a crisis by penetrating our rear communications. We expected that. The Kleist armored group, which had become free again after the opening of the bridgehead of Dnepropetrovsk, had been ordered from the outset, in such an event, to strike the gradually concentrating Russian divisions in the rear to the east and inflict a new defeat on them in cooperation with the German, Rumanian, and Hungarian troops operating from the west. The result of this battle of encirclement was the destruction once again of about 13 Soviet divisions. On the morning of October 11 the operation could be considered completed.
My Leibstandarte, another SS division, and two armored divisions thereupon drove forward in the direction of Rostov. They will be the spearhead of other strong forces that become free.
On October 2 came the enveloping breakthrough into the Timoshenko army group, namely at three points along a front more than 500 km. wide. Luftwaffe, armored force, and motorized units, but especially the infantry, not only proved their mettle again but outdid themselves. It was possible to encircle about 75 Russian divisions in three pockets and bring them to inescapable destruction.
Since then, strong units have been advancing against Moscow on a broad front.
Two other operations are envisaged for the destruction of the Russian divisions still stationed on the northern front. I hope that they, too, will lead to great successes. . Leningrad itself, Duce, will not be attacked, since I have no intention of sacrificing one man more than is absolutely necessary. Besides, we found in Kiev and only recently in Odessa that the Russians plant mines along whole street sections and especially in all important buildings, and after a while these mines either ignite automatically or are detonated by wireless action. According to statements by the Russians they have some more, quite special surprises prepared for us precisely in this field both in Leningrad and in Moscow. The important thing, however, is not to occupy cities but to destroy the enemy. Leningrad and Moscow will both fall, possibly without our being forced to put even a single man in the cities themselves and thereby perhaps sacrificing him. The Finns are of the same opinion and this is important because they are maintaining the northern investment front against Leningrad all alone with their own forces.
Bolshevism, moreover, is falling victim to its own treacherous designs. For only the gigantic concentration of all its means of attack on the German, Finnish, and Rumanian frontiers, respectively, forced the Red command to fight where the contest was most favorable to us. The inconceivable massing of its war material for an attack on us prevented it from withdrawing to the rear and fighting there, 1,000 or 2,000 km. away from its frontiers. To be sure, the location of its raw materials area or its large industrial centers made matters more difficult. All in all, we shall soon have either occupied, or be in a position to obtain, 70-90 percent of its industrial and raw materials capacity. In these circumstances, Duce, I do not think I am a rash prophet when I say that, regardless of what decisions Stalin may make, the Bolshevik empire is defeated.
With this, however, Duce, the sole and last great continental hope of the English will collapse.
That they have no illusions about this in London can scarcely be doubted. It therefore seems possible to me that under the pressure of public opinion they may perhaps at the last minute attempt some sort of relief offensive, however stupid this may be.
On this assumption I have already considered all the possibilities still open to England in such an eventuality.
As regards material, such help is ridiculous and in any case within a few weeks they will find no way of getting hi a sufficient quantity to whore it would he needed.
The same is also true of the so-called American help.
This is completely excluded. Moreover, we would naturally be gratified if they would somehow bring a few air force wings to Russia. In view of the difficulty of the position, the severity of the Russian winter, but especially the lack of any orderly and sure provision of supplies, they would be eliminated in a short while.
In view of the great prudence of the responsible men in Ankara I consider this out of the question, and for that matter also completely hopeless.
From the military point of view this would be extremely welcome to me. The forces that England would be able to send into action could only be small because of the supply conditions. But since they would then meet, not poorly equipped Arabs, but the best battle-seasoned troops, their annihilation could only be a question of a few weeks.
I have left strong forces in Norway. The country does not, of course, look as it did on April 9,1939,® any more. Hundreds of medium and heavy batteries have been installed. Supplies of food, fodder, and especially ammunition and fuel have been assured for a whole year. If the English should nevertheless get a foothold somewhere, I would consider it advantageous, for they could maintain themselves there only by a constant employment of troop transports and, to cover them, also cruisers, destroyers, etc. That would just be a repetition of the year 1940, with one difference, to be sure. At that time we had a couple of miserable airfields. Now, however, we have over 50 completed, first-class, airports with large runways, more than adequately protected, moreover, from any attempt at a surprise attack from the air. Furthermore, I have built up an armored force for Norway, which is being continually reinforced in order to be capable of lightning-like intervention with other motorized units wherever the need might arise. Oslo, Christiansund, Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik, Tr0ms up to Kirkenes, etc., are, moreover, protected with medium and heavy batteries, as well as by mine fields, in such a way that I could not wish for anything better than such an operation. Given the poor military leadership of the English, as I said before, nothing, after all, is excluded.
That is, in Denmark, Holland, Belgium, or western France, since even in the eyes of the English the German coasts can hardly come into consideration.
In reality, I could only welcome such an attempt, too. These coasts have been studded at all important points with hundreds and hundreds of batteries, up to 40.6 cm. in caliber. In addition, the whole area has been heavily mined and defense installations have been built which are sufficient to put up an initial, well-nigh insuperable defense immediately against any such attempt. Apart from that, I have left about 45 divisions in all in the west – that is, in France, Holland and Belgium alone- – some of which are among the best that we have. In addition, there are two armored formations [equipped] with French material and two armored divisions with German material. Apart from that, however, the first transports are already returning from the east to the west. And this is no additional burden whatever on our transportation system, because with these transports we can bring food supplies and ammunition to the eastern front and take troops back.
So transport trains are already, as stated, uninterruptedly returning with units from the eastern front, some of them to Germany, some of them directly to the west. The Luftwaffe, too, is beginning its transfers to the rear. I believe, therefore, that the English will in only a few weeks have lost all their short-lived gratification at having been able to bomb some- German cities without tenfold retaliation. Not to mention the fact that a new bomber type is now being produced in increasingly large series which in carrying capacity, range, and speed undoubtedly surpasses anything that the English have heretofore even thought possible. Moreover, newly formed armored divisions are also now on their way from the Reich itself to France and Norway.
So if the English should try to land anywhere in western Europe, it would lead to a catastrophe corresponding to the scale of the experiment.
For the troops that are now in the west and are actually drilling for such a contingency anyhow, day and night, it would probably even mean a certain relief. For we have many regiments there which as yet have had little such opportunity to distinguish themselves as is now afforded in the east.
I do not then know, Duce, whether the English, in view of their admittedly unpredictable military leadership, will try something like that, but I have in any case carefully made all preparations for it.
I do not believe that they would ever attempt anything more than a demonstration against Sardinia or Sicily, for even in case of initial success that, too, would lead to a continual destruction of their shipping tonnage
[...]
I do not know what the English intend to do, but in keeping with tradition it will in any case be something crazy.
Whatever they may attempt, however, one tiling is certain:
They no longer have any continental world power in Europe on which they can lean for support in the future!
With the collapse of their last continental support, Russia, the defense of Europe and North Africa is already ensured in any circumstances by our joint strength.
And if you should ever get into difficulties, Duce, I will help in so far as it is humanly possible.
I know nothing but joint victory.
Regardless of what England or even America may do, our economic position in particular cannot get any worse but must rather get better after a certain time has elapsed. And militarily no one can break us.
Permit me, Duce, in concluding this letter to express to you once more my special thanks for the cordial telegram you sent me after your departure.
With comradely affection and faithfulness,
Ever yours,
Adolf Hitler
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler
Rome, November 6. 1941
Führer:
I thank you, Führer, sincerely for the very interesting letter which you have sent me, and hasten to reply. I, too, believe that Bolshevism is crushed and incapable of any recovery even if it should succeed in establishing a “front” on the Ural Mountains or beyond. American and English aid will fail to alter the fact already accomplished, by which I mean the annihilation of their Bolshevik ally.
Before proceeding to a review of the military situation in the Mediterranean in particular, I should like to set forth to you some of my thoughts.
[...]
In the political area the party has complete control of the situation. That in a country of nearly 46 million inhabitants there should be a few tens of thousands of adversaries is more than understandable, but these splinters are of practically no account and are of no interest to political affairs but only to the police.
The thinking majority of the Italian people follows with admiration the feats of your armed forces, is determined to march at the side of Germany during the war and after, and, as I have told you above, wishes more than anything else to make a larger contribution to what will be the common victory.
Accept, Führer, the hearty expression of my comradely friendship and fidelity, in the hope to meet you as soon as possible on Italian soil.
Mussolini
Record of the Conversation Between the Führer and
Italian Foreign Minister Count Ciano
in Berlin on November 29,1941
At the start of the conversation the Führer developed his ideas concerning the general situation and came to the conclusion that on the whole the war was already won.
During his last meeting with the Duce he had given the latter a picture of the projected operations on the eastern front. At that time the German objectives had consisted of breaking the resistance of the Russians on the central and southern part of the front and then launching a thrust against the center. These operations had proceeded according to plan. The resistance that was still being offered in Russia did not come from man but from nature, that is, the weather and the character of the terrain. With 6 weeks of good weather Russia would have been liquidated by Germany.
Now Sevastopol was to be taken. The artillery for the offensive would be at the spot within the next few days. Then the attack would begin at once. The speed with which this next task would be executed was naturally conditioned by the weather. Moscow was to be encircled. No assault would be opened on the city, but gradually all of its communications with the outside world would be cut off. An additional task was the destruction of Leningrad.
[...]
In summary, then the future tasks were as follows:
The Führer illustrated Russia’s desperate situation with some figures. She had lost 65-75 percent of her total industry, 65-70 percent of her iron resources, 75 percent of her coal resources, 100 percent of her molybdenum, 75 percent of her manganese, and 75 percent of her aluminum. Because America obtained some of these resources from Russia, that country, too, would be affected by the losses. Furthermore, Russia had lost 3.8 million prisoners, 4 million dead, 22,800 tanks, 16,000 airplanes, and 28,000 guns. A recovery from these blows was impossible. Not only was the material lacking, but also trained troops. Industries could not be relocated without further ado, especially not in winter, when owing to the freezing of mortar and cement the erection of factory buildings and storehouses was impossible. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe was inflicting destruction precisely on industrial construction. Trains with valuable machine tools that were on the way to the east from a factory to be relocated were destroyed and the factories themselves bombarded.
[...]
The Führer then came to speak of the further German operation plans, and indicated as one of the aims of the German Army the Caucasus, from which Iran and Iraq were to be conquered. During this advance which would lead through desert areas with a hot climate, Italy could perhaps make a useful contribution. Mountain troops would be necessary for the Caucasus. Actually, of course, the conquest of the Caucasus was not decisive for the war, but one could probably ascribe such a character to the capture of Iran and Iraq, Syria and Palestine.
Furthermore, Italy could play a useful role if she made every effort to hold Africa.
[...]
Finally, the conversation turned to the domestic situation in Germany and in Italy. The Führer stated that the German people were acting admirably and that merely a small malicious unteachable minority in Germany stood apart. Wherever he showed himself in Germany, he received enthusiastic ovations as never before. This was, after all, a remarkable fact after 2 years of war.
Count Ciano replied that things were similar in Italy. At his visits to places like Parma and Bologna, which were considered especially difficult, the Duce had been received enthusiastically. Every intelligent Italian realized today that it was a matter of existence and the future of the country.
Moreover, the situation in Japan was similar. There, too, the great mass of the population was full of enthusiasm for the progressive course.